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“[T]he False Claims Act . . . has been . . . the Department’s primary
civil enforcement tool to combat fraud . . . .”1
“The [False Claims Act] . . . can be an oppressive bludgeon. . . .; a
favorite weapon of the federal government to regulate by terror. . . .”2
“[The False Claims Act] creates market place incentives to encourage the private sector to do the public’s work. . . . [It] change[s] the
dynamics in the workplace . . . .”3

Gripping tales of intrigue,4 smuggling,5 deceit,6 courage,7 dogged
persistence,8 extortion,9 and waste10 pour forth when one studies the

1. Health Care Initiatives Under the False Claims Act That Impact Hospitals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 38 (1998) [hereinafter Subcomm. on Claims Hearing] (statement of Donald K.
Stern, U.S. Attorney, Mass. Dist., and Chair, Attorney General’s Advisory Comm., U.S.
Dept. of Justice).
2. James J. Graham & T. Jeffery Fitzgerald, Curbing False Claims Act Abuse, BUS.
CRIMES BULL., Oct. 1998, at 1.
3. Interview with John R. Phillips, Co-Director, Center for Law in the Public Interest, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 3, 1987), in CORP. CRIME REP., Nov. 9, 1987, at 11 [hereinafter Phillips Interview]. Phillips is generally credited with passage of the 1986 amendments
which revitalized the False Claims Act (FCA). This interview is a fascinating account of
how the amendments came about, and how the FCA changes the dynamics within the
United States Department of Justice and within industries relevant to FCA liability. Id. at
5-12.
4. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d
1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 1994). Chester Walsh was a General Electric (GE) executive sent by
GE to Israel to serve as liaison to the Israeli military with regard to a contract between the
U.S. Department of Defense and Israel to supply the Israeli military with GEmanufactured F-110 fighter engines. After Walsh arrived in Israel, he discovered a scheme
by a high-level GE executive and a brigadier general in the Israeli military to defraud the
United States government on the contract. Fearing for his personal and job security, Walsh
used aliases to consult with attorneys about what to do regarding his suspicions. Id.
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Civil False Claims Act (FCA).11 The FCA creates a cause of action on
the part of “any person” who believes that another has submitted
false claims to the federal government.12 It has been heralded as one
of the most effective crime-fighting tools ever devised,13 and cursed as

5. Id. After Walsh discovered fraud upon the United States Government by a highranking GE executive and a brigadier general in the Israeli military, he feared for his personal safety. Id. Apparently, his concerns were reasonable. After the GE fraud came to
light, the Israeli General was court-martialed and pled guilty to conspiring to kidnap a potential witness and to injure and threaten the witness “to prevent him from testifying.”
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580, 583 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994). After seeing another GE whistleblower transferred, Walsh feared for his job security as well as his personal safety and requested a
transfer to Switzerland. Taxpayers Against Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1037. While awaiting transfer, Walsh began collecting evidence, including secretly recording conversations. Id. He hid
this evidence with common household goods when he moved from Israel to Switzerland. Id.
6. For example, Grace Pierce, M.D., was demoted from her position as associate director of medical research at Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation after she refused to proceed on human trials she and fellow researchers considered carcinogenic. Although Dr.
Pierce’s position on the carcinogenic nature of the drug in question was supported by FDA
guidelines, her supervisor, the executive director of medical research, “accused her of irresponsibility, lack of judgment and conduct unbecoming a director.” ALAN F. WESTIN,
WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 113 (1981).
7. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F.
Supp. 2d 1323, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2001). Alderson was fired and endured years of financial
hardship and personal and family stress after refusing to prepare two sets of Medicare cost
reports for his employer. Id.
8. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp.
2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000), rev’g 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Over a period of two years,
Merena spent hundreds of hours assisting and working with federal attorneys and agents
to investigate fraud at SmithKline Beecham Laboratories. United States ex rel. Merena v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 420, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
9. WESTIN, supra note 6, at 113.
10. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman, 145 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.
1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendants in qui tam action for insufficiency of
evidence). Relator filed suit after the Office of Inspector General of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs conducted an investigation and concluded that “allegations
could not be substantiated.” Id. at 1071.
11. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2002).
12. Id. § 3730(b).
13. For example, in fiscal year 2000 the “United States collected $1.5 billion in civil
fraud recoveries,” most of which, $1.2 billion, was collected through a private justice action,
the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA). FCA News: Top Qui Tam Recoveries
of 2000, 21 TAF Q. REV. 16, 18 (2001) [hereinafter FCA News] (reproducing November 2,
2000 press release from the Department of Justice). As one Department of Justice official
explained in 1996: “The recovery of over $1 billion demonstrates that the public-private
partnership encouraged by the statute [the FCA] works and is an effective tool in our continuing fight against fraudulent use of public funds.” TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, THE
1986 FALSE CLAIMS ACT AMENDMENTS, TENTH ANNIVERSARY REPORT 15 (1996) (quoting
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice); see
also Subcomm. on Claims Hearing, supra note 1, at 39 (Donald K. Stern, U.S. Attorney,
Mass. Dist., and Chair, Attorney General’s Advisory Comm., U.S. Dept. of Justice, stating
that “the False Claims Act . . . is a critical [civil enforcement] tool in fighting and deterring.”); Id. at 15 (Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs, Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, asserting that “[t]he False Claims
Act has been an essential tool to protect the integrity of the Medicare program.” To achieve
this goal “of ‘zero tolerance’ of Medicare fraud and abuse . . . the Government relies on a
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irresponsible and disruptive to a healthy economy.14 What is clear is
that the False Claims Act, with its unique partnering of private individuals and governmental investigators, fundamentally alters public
number of enforcement options—criminal, civil, and administrative, as well as educational
outreach efforts. Chief among the enforcement tools has been the False Claims Act.”); Id.
at 25 (Dr. Robert A. Berenson, director, Center for Health Care Plans and Providers Administration, Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Services, claiming that “the False Claims Act is an important tool for . . . law enforcement
. . . to pursue fraud and abuse.”).
[To deal with health care fraud and abuse,] Congress in recent years [has] expand[ed] statutory authority and [increaseed] resources to deal with the problem. However, none of these things are likely to play a more important role in
recovering improper payments or in acting as a deterrent than the False
Claims Act. Use of the FCA by Federal authorities has become an important
tool for fighting fraud and abuse in many programs, including the Medicare
program.
Id. at 63 (statement of Ruth Blacker, member, National Legislative Counsel, American Association of Retired Persons).
14. See William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation
in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 205 (1998) (describing
how the False Claims Act is regarded by many government contractors as “a costly, substantial burden of doing business with the government”); John T. Boese & Beth C.
McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False Claims Act to Enforce the AntiKickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 50 (1999) (According to Boese, foremost expert on the FCA
and a respected defense counsel, because of the FCA, “health care providers today are expected to operate in an almost kafkaesque environment, where conventional conduct is
made illegal and where the government is permitted broad prosecutorial discretion, the exercise of which is unpredictable and subject to being overruled by both private citizens and
other branches of the government.” Id.; see also Michael Kendall, The Indiscriminate Targeting of Hospitals with False Claims Act, BUS. CRIMES BULL., June 1997, at 4-5.
[T]he government is threatening to use the False Claims Act to punish billing
errors that are frequently the result not of intentional lies but of negligence or
attempts to comply with vague rules. Virtually any billing dispute can be labeled a violation of Medicare billing rules. This is a lucrative strategy. Given
the cost of litigation and the consequences of losing, health care providers frequently settle in response to the government’s threats [to sue under the FCA].
Id.; Harvey Berkman, Spoils to Bounty Hunters, Federal Contractors Gripe, NAT’L L.J.,
Mar. 4, 1996, at B1, B1-B2.
Critics of [the FCA] argue that the rise in whistleblower suits does not reflect a
sudden unearthing of a large amount of fraud. Rather, they contend, companies, without intending to defraud, can make mistakes in handling complex
government contracts and find themselves pressured to settle suits to avoid the
far larger penalties than can follow a False Claims Act trial.
Id.; Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn Anyone into a Crook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21,
2000, at A18.
Has it [our renowned health-care system] become host to widespread malfeasance? While politicians would like us to think so, the simpler answer is that
health-care regulations have just become too complicated to understand.
....
Given the tangled web of Medicare legislation, more fraud investigations are
inevitable. Rather than engaging in a long, protracted fight to set the record
straight, throughout which share prices suffer and business slumps, a health
company’s best bet may simply be to hand over the files and get on with business.
Id.; Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 45 (1998) (supplying an overview of industry attacks on the False Claims Act).
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regulatory theory and practice. It does so by changing the world of
regulation from a two-party dynamic between regulator (R) and targeted business (T) to a three-party dynamic between R, T, and a private party (P) who files suit under the False Claims Act and thereby
becomes a player in the regulatory game.
This new dynamic presents fascinating questions: Why would
regulators cede any of their independence and prosecutorial discretion to private parties? Should regulators breach the traditional and
often necessary confidentiality in which they work by allowing private individuals to join them in investigating and prosecuting
wrongdoing? Why would a private individual want to work with
regulators, especially when doing so may create significant personal,
professional, and financial hardships? How does the private-public
partnering produced by the FCA affect the decisions and strategies
adopted by targets and defendants? Using Game Theory analysis, I
look at these questions. Because of its focus on how and why people
decide whether to cooperate, Game Theory is an especially enlightening lens with which to view the regulatory world created by the False
Claims Act.15 Through its disciplined modeling, Game Theory allows
us to address these questions rigorously and supply some answers.
I have two goals in this Article. The first is to explore how a private attorney general model such as the FCA alters the regulatory
world, and whether the alteration is for better or worse. This is a
worthy topic because of what it tells us about the merits of any
mechanism that integrates private citizens into law enforcement efforts. As our world becomes more complex and global—and more vulnerable to systemic wrongdoing—such integration may be a necessary component of an effective public regulatory system.
My second goal in this Article is to demonstrate the extraordinary
versatility and effectiveness of Game Theory for analyzing legal issues. Developed in the fields of mathematics and economics, Game
Theory remains on the fringe of legal thought, used by a few;16 ignored by most. I hope to convince others of what I have come to realize—Game Theory is enormously useful for thinking about legal issues and public policy questions.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the False Claims Act
and emphasizes the changing roles it creates for public regulators,
regulated industry, and private parties who join in the regulatory
game. This Part shows that the FCA is important because of what it
15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 19-23 (5th ed. 1998);
MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 1 (1994).
16. Legal academics who have employed Game Theory to analyze legal and policy issues include Jason Scott Johnson. See Jason Scott Johnson, A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343
(2002).
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tells us about the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of any system that
deploys private persons into public regulatory efforts. Part II of this
Article summarizes general principles of Game Theory. Part III uses
Game Theory to examine the changes in the regulatory world
brought about by the False Claims Act. Part III concludes by drawing
lessons from Game Theory about optimal strategies for the players in
this new regulatory world. Stories from FCA cases abound throughout this Article, for it is through them that theory meets reality. As
these stories show, FCA cases involve high stakes and strange alliances.
I. THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. Overview
The False Claims Act,17 first passed in 1863,18 and amended several times since,19 most dramatically in 1986,20 grows out of a long
tradition of using private parties to supplement law enforcement efforts.21 Such actions, termed “informer” actions, were common in
thirteenth-century England and colonial America.22 These early actions provided for minimal, if any, oversight of “informers,” and were

17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2002).
18. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696-98. Incensed at shoddy equipment
delivered by suppliers to the Union Army and scam artists who delivered nothing at all
though were paid for it, President Abraham Lincoln sought to have the False Claims Act
passed. Priscilla R. Budeiri, The Return of Qui Tam, WASH. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 24,
25. He described those at whom the Act was aimed:
Worse than traitors in arms are the men who pretend loyalty to the flag, feast
and fatten on the misfortunes of the Nation while patriotic blood is crimsoning
the plains of the South.
Id. at 26.
19. Rev. Stat. 3490-94 and 5438 (1875); 89 CONG. REC. S7606 (Sept. 17, 1943); False
Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153; Pub. L. No. 103-272,
108 Stat. 1362 (1994).
20. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153. The
1986 Amendments are credited with revitalizing the FCA, which had fallen into disuse.
JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 1.04[H] (2d ed. Supp. 2003).
The 1986 amendments increased the amount of recovery a private party who brought an
FCA action (termed a “relator”) could receive; guaranteed a minimum amount of recovery
for the relator; relaxed the “jurisdictional bar” provisions which had prevented many relators from filing suit; clarified and relaxed the mens rea requirement; expanded the statute
of limitations; clarified the burden of proof; and added protection for whistleblowers who
are retaliated against by their employers. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 45-47 (2002).
21. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2000); Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in
the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 905, 909-17 (2002) [hereinafter Bucy, Information
as a Commodity]; Bucy, supra note 20, at 12-54; Note, The History and Developments of
Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81 [hereinafter History and Developments].
22. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 909-17; Beck, supra note 21,
at 565-608; History and Developments, supra note 21, at 83-91.
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subject to many abuses.23 By the mid-twentieth century, they had
been abolished in England24 and fell into disuse in America.25
In American jurisprudence today there are a number of actions
that private parties may bring alleging that a defendant has violated
some federal or state law.26 To the extent these actions supplement
the efforts of law enforcement in detecting, proving, and deterring
lawbreaking, the private parties who bring them serve as “private attorney generals.” In almost all of these actions, the private party who
brings the action has been personally injured by the defendant’s conduct.27 The False Claims Act is unique among these actions because
it allows a private party who has not been personally injured to bring
the FCA action alleging violation of public laws by the defendant.28
Briefly, here is how the FCA works. A person who believes that he
has information and evidence that someone else (individual or company) has filed false claims against the federal government may file a
lawsuit making such allegations.29 This plaintiff (termed a “relator”)
is required to file his lawsuit under seal (not even serving it on the
defendant). The relator is also required to give a copy of the lawsuit
to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), along with a written report of “all material evidence and information” the relator possesses.30 The lawsuit stays under seal, often for two years or more, to
allow the DOJ to fully investigate the charges made by the relator.31
The secrecy provided by sealing the complaint not only protects a defendant’s reputation if the relator’s information amounts to noth23. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 909-17. For example, a party
that expected to be charged with a crime would “locate a friendly informer who would file
suit” against the defendant and settle for an amount less than the defendant would have
paid the government had there been a prosecution by the government. Id. This strategy
worked to defendants’ advantage since prosecution by an informer precluded prosecution
by the government. Id. at 913.
Other “common abuse by informers [included] filing suit in a venue far from where the
defendant lived,” bringing suit “under obsolete or little known statutes, or for popular conduct that constituted a technical offense,” or simply extortion not to prosecute. Id. at 914.
24. Common Informers Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 39 (Eng.) (abolishing most informers actions); Act to Redress Disorders in Common Informers, 1956, 18 Eliz., ch. 5, §4
(imposing sanctions against informers who brought vexatious suits).
25. 89 CONG. REC. S7606 (Sept. 17, 1943), codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 232-235 (1976)
(limiting relators’ ability to bring FCA actions and limiting the proceeds relators could receive if they brought an action).
26. See, e.g., The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000 &
Supp. 2001); American Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2002); The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2002); Guardian Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582,
593-95 (1983) (implying § 1981 under Title VI); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717
(1979) (implying § 1981 under Title IX).
27. Bucy, supra note 20, at 13.
28. The FCA provides, “[a] person may bring a civil action for a violation [of this Act]
for the person and for the United States Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2002).
29. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
30. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
31. ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER 33 (2000).
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ing,32 but also facilitates the DOJ’s further investigation of the relator’s information.33
At the conclusion of its investigation, the DOJ decides whether it
will intervene in the lawsuit as an additional plaintiff. If it does, the
DOJ assumes “primary responsibility” for the case, although the relator remains as a plaintiff and is guaranteed a participatory role.34
In some cases, the DOJ handles the entire case after intervening; in
others, relators work hand-in-hand with government prosecutors. In
some cases, relators and their attorneys assume the bulk of the investigative and litigative duties.35
If the DOJ does not join the lawsuit, the relator may continue
pursuing the case, litigating it alone.36 Even if the DOJ does not join
a relator’s case, it retains authority over the relator’s lawsuit in several ways: the DOJ monitors the case and may join it at any time,
even for limited purposes, such as appeal;37 the DOJ may settle or
dismiss a relator’s suit over the relator’s objections as long as the relator has been given an opportunity in court to be heard;38 the DOJ
may seek limitations on the relator’s involvement in the case,39 or
32. Bucy, supra note 20, at 69-70.
33. Phillips Interview, supra note 3, at 9. Phillips, who is generally credited as the
person responsible for the 1986 Amendments to the FCA, explained how the sealing provision came about:
The Justice Department resisted these qui tam provisions of the False Claims
Act. If you look at the record, the Justice Department didn’t want them
changed at all. One argument that was advanced was, “you are going to make
our job more difficult because as soon as you file these complaints, it is public
information, and we can’t do our normal investigations. If we want to put a
wire on somebody or do an undercover investigation, you have blown the cover
instantly, so this is a bad idea.” My response was to say, “fine, we will draft a
seal provision so that it is under seal until you decide to join the case. . . .” It is
a very unusual provision in that regard. What [it] did was [to] completely negate the argument advanced by the Justice Department.
Id.; See, e.g., WEST, supra note 31; S. REP. NO. 99-345 at 16 (1986) reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5281.
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
35. For other examples of FCA qui tam cases where the relator and relator’s counsel
assumed large amounts of responsibility for the preparation of the case, see United States
ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001);
United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (facts more fully discussed in United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1998), rev’d, 205 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 2000)).
36. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
37. Id.; see, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 770 (2000); United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 486,
489 (5th Cir. 2001).
38. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B). The DOJ may even move for dismissal or oppose a
settlement without intervening. See, e.g., Juliano v. Fed. Asset Disposition Assoc., 736 F.
Supp. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1990) (moving to dismiss relator’s case by the DOJ after declining to intervene); United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 340-41 (6th
Cir. 2000) (intervening by the DOJ to oppose the settlement reached by relator and defendant after declining to take the case).
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
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seek alternative remedies (such as administrative sanctions) in lieu
of the relator’s lawsuit.40
If the government joins the relator’s case, the relator is guaranteed at least 15 percent of any judgment or settlement and the court
can award more—up to 25 percent. If the government does not join
the lawsuit, the relator is guaranteed 25 percent and could receive up
to 30 percent.41 The amount within the statutory award depends
upon the relator’s helpfulness to the government.42 Because the
FCA’s damages and penalty provisions tend to generate exceptionally
large judgments,43 relators’ percentages involve substantial sums.44
The case of United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health
Group45 shows how the FCA works. It is typical in that it shows the
steps of an FCA qui tam action. It is atypical because of the unusual
contribution made by the relator to pursuing the case; in this respect,
Alderson exemplifies the FCA working to its fullest potential.
In the 1980s, Alderson was the Chief Financial Officer at North
Valley Hospital in Whitefish, Montana. He had been so employed for
six and one-half years.46 In August 1990, Quorum Health Group took
over as the management company for the hospital. Soon thereafter a
Quorum representative instructed Alderson to prepare two Medicare
cost reports. Hospitals that participate in the Medicare program by
treating Medicare patients must submit annual cost reports. These
are lengthy, detailed reports that provide extensive information
about a hospital’s costs.47 Alderson was told to prepare an “aggres40. Id. § 3730(c)(5).
41. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
42. The FCA has four built-in features to reward only those relators who actually
supply helpful information. First, the FCA directs courts to determine what percentage,
within the statutory range, of the judgment should be given to the relator based upon how
helpful the relator was in “advancing the case to litigation.” Id. § 3730(d)(1). Second, a
court is directed to reduce the share of the award further if the relator “planned or initiated” the FCA violation and to exclude the relator from receiving any portion of the award
if she has been convicted of conduct constituting the FCA violation. Id. § 3730(d)(3). Third,
the FCA’s jurisdictional bar provision prohibits a qui tam case from going forward if the information it includes is already public (unless the relator is the “original source” of the information). Id. § 3730(e)(4). Lastly, the FCA provides that only the first qualifying qui tam
lawsuit may proceed. Id. § 3730(b)(5).
43. For example, recent judgements in FCA qui tam cases include an $875 million
settlement from TAP Pharmaceuticals, 55 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGT. 10 (2002), a $745 million settlement with HCA Healthcare Corporation to resolve some of the alleged FCA violations pending against HCA; a $385 million settlement with National Medical Care, Inc.;
a $325 million settlement with SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratory; a $325 million
settlement with National Medical Enterprises; and a $110 million settlement with National Health Laboratories. BOESE, supra note 20, § 1.05[A].
44. Recent relators’ awards include $44.8 million, $28.9 million, and $18.1 million.
FCA News, supra note 13, at 20.
45. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
46. Id. at 1325.
47. Form HCFA 2552, Cost Reports for Hospitals (on file with author). Cost reports
are lengthy and complex, consisting of hundreds of worksheets and requiring detailed in-
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sive” cost report to submit to Medicare, and a “reserve” report to be
used internally.48
Alderson refused to prepare the two inconsistent reports. He was
terminated four days later.49 Within months, Alderson filed a wrongful termination suit.50 During depositions regarding his termination,
Alderson learned of additional irregularities in Quorum’s costreporting practices. He sought documents that would shed further
light on such practices and engaged a forensic accounting expert.51 In
1992, two years after his termination by Quorum, Alderson filed a
pro se FCA qui tam complaint alleging that Quorum’s cost reporting
practice defrauded the Medicare program. As required by the FCA,
Alderson provided the federal government with a copy of his complaint and a written statement of the information and evidence he
had gathered supporting the charges in his complaint.52
Unable to find another job after being fired from North Valley
Hospital, Alderson and his family suffered financially for years after
his termination. His family was forced to move from its comfortable
home to a cramped apartment in another town. They used the college
savings they had accumulated for their two teenage children.53
For nine years after he filed his pro se FCA complaint, Alderson
spent thousands of hours working on his FCA case,54 retained two
different law firms to represent him in the action55 and, either by
himself or with his attorneys, met often with DOJ attorneys and/or
investigators, mostly in Washington, D.C., and at his own expense.56
At these meetings, Alderson explained how Quorum’s reserve cost
report practice defrauded the Medicare Program.57 When DOJ attorneys expressed concern about a legal theory to support an FCA case,

formation about the facility, its staff and operation. Providers are required to allocate various costs, including capital expenditures, medical education costs, travel, malpractice insurance premiums and payments, and every type of patient care costs to various centers,
designated by whether the patient was a Medicare patient and whether the expense is
properly reimbursable to the Medicare program. ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE
FRAUD, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE § 2.02[4] (2003).
48. Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1325-26.
53. Kurt Eichenwald, He Blew the Whistle, and Health Giants Quaked, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1998, § 3, at 1.
54. Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1330.
55. Approximately one year after filing his pro se qui tam complaint, Alderson retained a law firm that specialized in health care law to handle his qui tam case. Id. at
1325. In 1995, Alderson changed to a law firm that specialized in FCA qui tam cases. Id. at
1327. This firm represented Alderson until the case was resolved.
56. Id. at 1325-29.
57. Id.
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or what they viewed as weak evidence or minimal damage,58 Alderson addressed their concerns.59 The forensic accountant Alderson retained, and continued to pay, met with DOJ officials in Washington,
D.C. to assist Alderson in explaining the fraud to the DOJ attorneys.60
Working with the DOJ attorneys and investigators, Alderson
identified voluminous documents that government investigators
should subpoena from Quorum.61 At the DOJ’s request, he reviewed
the documents obtained by subpoena.62 These were extensive: eight
boxes of more than 11,000 records from 197 hospitals for seven years.
For one year, working alone, Alderson analyzed the records and prepared a spread sheet summary of relevant cost reserve information.
He “culled a set of 2,500 documents that corroborated . . . specific reserve information” and presented his summary, spreadsheet, and
relevant documents to the DOJ.63
Seven years after Alderson filed his action,64 the DOJ agreed to intervene in Alderson’s lawsuit, but only after receiving “assurances
from Alderson’s counsel of their ability and willingness to commit the
necessary resources to the case and to undertake the principal role in
prosecuting the litigation.”65 Thereafter, Alderson’s counsel:
• assisted in drafting the DOJ’s amended complaint;66
• retained auditors to analyze one-half of the cost reports (government auditors analyzed the other half);67
• handled the third-party discovery, including the
preparation and service of subpoenas to 200 hospitals
nationwide; performing this task required that Alderson’s lawyers hire two additional associates;68
• “contributed substantially to the motion practice and
discovery that followed the filing of the [amended]
complaint”;69

58. DOJ attorneys believed the fraud to be $10 million or less, too low to consider. Id.
at 1325-31.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1325-26.
61. Id. at 1326.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1326.
64. Id. at 1329.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1327.
68. Id. at 1330, 1330 n.22.
69. Id. at 1329-30.
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• worked with the DOJ in combined efforts to respond to
defense motions to dismiss;70 and
• directed a two-year substantial, sustained mediation
on behalf of the plaintiffs to reach a settlement in the
case.71
The case ultimately settled for $85.7 million.72 Alderson’s share
was approximately $20.6 million. The average relator’s award, when
the government intervenes, is sixteen percent of the judgment recovered.73 When awarding Alderson an unusually large award of twentyfour percent, the court looked to the FCA, its legislative history, DOJ
Guidelines for Relator’s Award,74 Alderson’s persistence,75 expertise,
the personal sacrifices he made to help the government,76 and the
significant contribution of Alderson’s counsel in pursuing the case.77
Alderson’s attorneys were awarded $2.7 million in attorneys fees
pursuant to the FCA’s requirement that culpable defendants should
pay “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.”78
The court that determined Alderson’s share described Alderson’s
contribution to the case: “The record graphically demonstrates Alderson’s profound personal and professional commitment to success in
this litigation. His commitment manifested itself in his persistent labors and those of his attorneys and accountants, all of whom contributed mightily both before and after the United States intervened.”79
B. The Changing Regulatory Dynamics Created by the FCA
Before the FCA was revitalized with amendments in 1986 and became a factor in federal law enforcement, the only effective way to

70. Id. at 1330.
71. Id. Alderson also attended and participated in all of the mediation conferences,
held throughout the United States. Id.
72. Id. at 1339.
73. Panel: FCA Enforcement in the Post-Stevens World, A.B.A. NAT’L INST. ON THE
CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND QUI TAM ENFORCEMENT (2000) (Discussion with Michael
Hertz, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
74. Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-35.
75. Id. at 1336-38. According to the court, “[o]nly [Alderson’s] dogged resolution, eventually supported by competent professionals and an occasionally reluctant government, resulted in the millions now available for distribution.” Id. at 1338.
76. Id. at 1337-38.
77. Id. at 1335. According to the court, “[t]he record establishes that Alderson’s counsel contributed significantly (in both quality and quantity) and at certain moments crucially to this case. That contribution deserves manifest and telling weight in determining
the proper relator’s award.” Id. The award of attorneys fees and costs was in addition to
the contingency portion of his award that Alderson agreed to pay to his attorneys. Id. at
1335 n.35.
78. Id. at 1330 n.25 (awarding attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §
3730(d)(1) (2002)).
79. Id. at 1338.
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investigate what appeared to be intentional fraud80 against the government was before a grand jury, as a criminal matter.81 Grand jury
investigations of complex economic wrongdoing are tedious and
lengthy.82 Investigators must pierce enough of the corporate veil to
figure out what has taken place, who is involved, how far and deep
the wrongdoing goes, and since the case is being investigated as a
criminal matter, whether the fraud was intentional rather than the
result of mistakes, inexperience, overwork, or sloppiness.
Grand jury investigations proceed step-by-slow-step. They often
begin with interviews of the source who first alerted law enforcement
that there may be a possible problem. Next, relevant financial records are subpoenaed. These records are analyzed to determine what
documents, transactions, individuals, or companies may be involved.
More records are subpoenaed and analyzed.83
This process continues until the investigation stops turning up
new information. Often, the most helpful evidence comes from slow,
painstaking tasks such as charting checking and savings account deposits and withdrawals, and correlating those with significant business transactions. Generally, only after documentary investigation
has revealed what is going on, or the investigation has reached an
impasse, do investigators resort to questioning live witnesses. This is
because there are risks in questioning witnesses without a full picture of what was going on and who was involved. Throughout an investigation, investigators must guard against alerting those who may
destroy or alter evidence, or threaten or tamper with witnesses.
Rarely in grand jury investigations will a knowledgeable insider
offer helpful information or be willing to cooperate until law enforcement has established that individual’s involvement in the
wrongdoing. Most insiders are too fearful of the consequences of cooperating with the government to do so under any other circumstance. Thus, prosecutors secure cooperation from a knowledgeable
insider only by negotiating leniency in exchange for the insider’s testimony. Such negotiation is always a gamble since prosecutors may
not know until it is too late that they have cut a deal with an individual who has greater culpability than those he is being asked to
80. The FCA includes a mens rea requirement of “knowingly,” which the FCA defines
as “actual knowledge of the information,” “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information,” or “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. §
3729(b) (2002). This is the same definition for mens rea used in many criminal offenses.
See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701-04 (9th Cir. 1976).
81. See, e.g., JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 154 (1987) (regarding the value of
the grand jury in conducting investigations of wrongdoing).
82. Id. at 23, 222, 243-45, 248-49.
83. See generally PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 2.06, 4.02 (3d ed. Supp. 1997); SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 6 (2d ed. 2001).
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testify against.84 Such mishaps are always a possibility since investigators rarely have a full understanding of the fraud at the time they
must decide who to approach for cooperation. There is another danger in conscripting witnesses with a cooperation-for-leniency exchange: such individuals often are not trustworthy.85 They tend to
minimize their own involvement or that of their friends and close colleagues.86 Corroboration is always necessary to verify their information.87 It is also difficult for investigators to know whether they have
fully uncovered the scope of the wrongdoing and wrongdoers, or the
number and identity of all victims.88
Imagine what a knowledgeable insider can add to this investigation process. It would be invaluable to have an insider who knows
everything about the organization being investigated and who can
explain the full scope of the wrongdoing, identify everyone who was
involved, when they became involved, and the extent to which they
were involved. A knowledgeable insider can identify which records
and transactions to examine, what companies and businesses are involved in the relevant transactions, and who the victims are. With
such information, investigations could proceed more quickly and
thoroughly, clearing those who are not culpable and gathering available evidence against those who are.
It is this dynamic that the FCA changes. The FCA encourages
honest, non-culpable insiders to come forward and to work with investigators throughout an entire case. Because of the way it is structured (honest insiders can receive a significant recovery, but culpable
insiders receive less, or nothing) the FCA entices honest insiders, not
the culpable individuals grand jury investigations tend to unearth.
Because of their credibility advantages, these non-culpable insiders
are more valuable to government investigators than are those who
are cooperating only to save themselves and who become willing to
cooperate only after the government has already proven much of
what occurred. By tying the amount of the insider’s award to the insider’s helpfulness, the FCA encourages insiders to work with investigators by supplying information and providing other assistance.89

84. STEWART, supra note 81, at 139-40, 202-08, 220.
85. Id. at 214, 223, 241.
86. Id. at 25-27, 158, 165, 217.
87. Id. at 163.
88. See generally DIAMOND, supra note 83, § 4.02; BEALE ET AL., supra note 83, § 6:1.
89. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2002) (requiring that in determining what percentage,
within the mandatory range, of the judgment shall be awarded to the relator, a court
“tak[e] into account the significance of the information and the role of the person bringing
the action in advancing the case to litigation”); United States ex rel Alderson v. Quorum
Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333-34 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (listing DOJ guidelines).
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Besides bringing helpful inside information of wrongdoing, qui
tam relators also bring investigative and litigative talent to regulators. The FCA, both by its terms and its practice, provides significant
financial inducement not only for insiders but also for experienced,
skilled attorneys who represent relators’ cases. Under the FCA, successful relators recover attorneys fees and costs from defendants.90 In
practice, additional compensation for relators’ counsel has evolved.
Relators generally negotiate with their attorneys to pay a percentage
of the relator’s award to counsel.91 This total package of attorneys
fees, costs, and percentage of the relator’s award can be quite lucrative—enough to lure skilled counsel from other sophisticated areas of
practice.
The case of Michael R. Lissack demonstrates the dual resources of
insider information and legal talent that qui tam relators bring to
regulators.92 Michael R. Lissack was a highly successful investment
banker at Smith Barney, becoming, for example, the second youngest
person to serve as a managing director in Smith Barney’s history.
One day, Lissack made an anonymous phone call to a United States
Attorney’s office that was investigating certain investment firms for
various frauds. Lissack described another fraud, “yield burning,” that
was quite massive and about which law enforcement knew nothing.93
By law, the investment banks are required to price securities no
higher than fair market value. They are also required to reimburse
the United States Treasury for any profits they reap on their handling of municipal securities.94 Yield burning occurs when investment
banks price securities in excess of fair market value and retain the
profits this generates, rather than passing them on to the United
States Treasury in the form of lower interest payments as required.
In Lissack’s initial phone call to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and in
multiple later conversations, all made anonymously, Lissack explained yield burning to prosecutors who were unfamiliar with the
practice, and described how it was diverting millions of dollars from
the Treasury.95
One and one-half years later, in February 1995, when nothing had
yet been done to stop yield burning, despite his telephone calls, Lissack decided to force the government to act by taking action himself.

90. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
91. See id.
92. Erika A. Kelton, The False Claims Act and Wall Street: How a Qui Tam Case Reformed the Municipal Bond Market, 19 TAF Q. REV. 35-44 (2000); Charles Gasparino,
Muni Matters: Cities Have a Headache Thanks to Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1997,
at A1; cf. Wall Street Update, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2002, at C2.
93. Kelton, supra note 92, at 35.
94. Id. at 36-37.
95. Id. at 35-36.
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He filed a FCA qui tam lawsuit against national and regional investment banks. After seven years, this case settled for a total of
$200 million, with thirty investment banks paying the damages
awarded.96
Lissack’s FCA suit got the attention of the Securities Exchange
Commission, which initiated multiple investigations and ultimately
sanctioned individuals and banks. Lissack’s qui tam suit also got the
attention of the Internal Revenue Service, which initiated a review of
the tax-exempt status of hundreds of tax-free municipal bonds. The
IRS concluded its review by issuing a new Revenue Procedure to protect the Treasury from losses of any yield-burning activity in the future. The IRS’s new procedure placed the burden on public issuers to
detect future yield-burning situations, or to repay any yield-burning
profits realized.
In addition to filing a federal FCA action, Lissack filed a qui tam
action under the California False Claims Act. In this suit, Lissack alleged that the yield-burning activity of one investment banker, Lazard Feres & Company, caused the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (LAMTA) to incur losses of approximately
$3 million. The State of California intervened in Lissack’s suit and
hired Lissack’s qui tam team of lawyers to represent LAMTA. In
1998, Lazard settled the California action, agreeing to pay treble
damages of $9 million.97
The Lissack case shows the contributions that a knowledgeable
insider and his counsel can make to exposing and preventing fraud:
Lissack alerted regulators to a significant, systemic, complex theft
that was depriving the federal government of millions of dollars and
of which regulators were unaware. When regulators failed to act to
stop the practice one and one-half years after Lissack told regulators
about it, he rallied regulators to action by filing his own lawsuit. To
prepare the case, Lissack’s legal team gathered public bond transaction documents from more than 500 issuers and retained economic
experts who generated evidence with multiple regression analysis on
more than 1900 individual Treasury securities.98 Their analysis demonstrated how yield burning defrauded the federal government.99
With his knowledge of investment banking and the yield-burning
practice, Lissack was able to anticipate and rebut defenses.100 Lissack
and his attorneys supplied significant expertise, labor, and resources
to investigate and prepare the case. Lissack’s whistleblowing led to
96. Telephone Interview with Erika A. Kelton, counsel for Michael Lissack, Phillips &
Cohen (Mar. 25, 2003).
97. Kelton, supra note 92, at 42.
98. Id. at 39.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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fundamental changes in how municipal financing occurs, which better protects federal and state treasuries from massive graft and
theft.101
C. Tensions Created by the FCA
Despite the benefits the FCA presents to government regulators
and to participaing private parties, the FCA creates tensions. For
starters, it forces regulators to compromise the veil of secrecy that
traditionally has surrounded government investigations.102 The FCA
also aligns the interest of private individuals to that of government
regulators instead of to professional colleagues and employers. This
shift in loyalty often creates considerable personal and professional
struggles.103 For all of these reasons—habit, confidentiality, personal
hardship—it is difficult for regulators and private individuals to
work together to investigate and prove wrongdoing. Often, the tensions grow as the FCA case proceeds.104 In some cases, the two plaintiffs, the DOJ and the relator, battle.105 The DOJ may oppose a relator, as when the DOJ argues that a relator should be dismissed from
the case.106 The relator and the DOJ may disagree on trial strategy,

101. Id. at 44.
102. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). “A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer,
an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney
for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made [as permitted in this Rule]
shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury . . . .” Id. “A knowing violation
. . . may be punished as a contempt of court.” Id.
103. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 948-58.
104. Although the relator should be aware that opposing the DOJ on such issues may
earn the relator a reduced percentage of the judgment for failing to be cooperative. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Coughlin v. IBM Corp., 992 F. Supp. 137, 141-42 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
105. Several courts have noted the DOJ’s antagonism to relators, especially when it
comes to sharing the judgement. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580
(S.D. Ohio 1992).
No one likes “snitches,” but they can be valuable. In view of their widespread
use, it is worthy of note that the Department of Justice has considered such individuals as adversaries rather than allies. This is not the first case where this
Court has noted the antagonism of the Justice Department to a whistleblower.
The reason continues to be unknown, but the attitude is clear.
Id. at 584; see also United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 352, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2000):
I recognize that the government’s present litigation stance is that Mr. Merena
helped very little and merely provided basically clerical assistance that the
government could have obtained without him. In view of the many public accolades previously given him by the same government officials responsible for the
prosecution of the case, I have trouble accepting or even rationalizing the government’s present position other than attributing it to an over-zealous attempt
to lower the amount of the award rightfully due.
106. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grant v. Rush-Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Med. Ctr.,
No. 99C06313, 2001 WL 40807, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2001); United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991); Merena, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
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such as lifting the seal to permit discussions with the defendant107 or
granting the DOJ an extension of the sealing period.108 Although the
DOJ and the relator may work cooperatively for years, the DOJ may
oppose the relator when dividing the settlement.109
Strange alliances also develop. The relator and the defendant may
work together against the DOJ—as when the DOJ opposes a settlement reached by the relator and the defendant.110 Or, the relator and
the defendant may join forces to oppose individuals who seek to qualify as qui tam relators.111 The DOJ and the defendant may join forces
to exclude the relator.112 Perhaps most oddly of all, offices within the
DOJ may oppose one another as to how a relator should be treated.113
The case of United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp.114 demonstrates these odd dynamics. A financial systems analyst at SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratory (SBCL),115 Robert
Merena served as supervisor of the “Response Department,” where
he handled SBCL’s payments from Medicare and other insurers.116

107. This is a common strategy in qui tam cases. See Kathleen McDermott, Qui Tam,
An AUSA’s Perspective, 11 TAF Q. REV. 20, 25-26 (1997).
108. While it may be to the relator’s benefit to agree to extensions of the seal so as to
allow the DOJ to fully investigate the relator’s claims and prepare the case if the DOJ determines it is meritorious, the delay hurts the relator because it gives time for more relators to file qui tam lawsuits regarding the same transactions. As long as the initial qui tam
suit is under seal, of course, no one, including future relators, will know about it and
thereby be deterred from filing their own qui tam action. Although the FCA is clear that
only the first relator to file a qui tam action may proceed with the case, and all other subsequent qui tam actions arising from the same transaction must be dismissed, the first-tofile relator will have to protect her status, often through lengthy, involved litigation. Part
of the reason such litigation becomes complex is that the parties likely will have to delve
deeply into the facts of the various qui tam complaints, to determine whether the various
actions truly arise from the same transaction, and whether some relators (the first to file,
perhaps) may be jurisdictionally barred from proceeding, thereby clearing the way for the
subsequently-filing relators to proceed. See generally Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 14, at
36-37.
109. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F.
Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001); United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Gen. Elec., 808 F. Supp. at 583-84.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 436-41 (6th
Cir. 2000).
111. Marc Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, A Case Study: Department of Justice v. Qui
Tam Relators, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, 2 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., June 3, 1998, at
425.
112. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grant v. Rush-Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Med. Ctr.,
No. 99C06313, 2001 WL 40807 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2001).
113. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 436-37. Prosecutors within the DOJ testified differently
as to how much assistance Robert Merena, a relator, had provided and therefore what percentage of the recovery he was entitled to upon settlement of the case. Id.
114. 114 F. Supp. 2d. 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000), on remand from 205 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 2000),
rev’g 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
115. Id. at 360.
116. Merena spent his entire SBCL career at SBCL’s national headquarters. Merena,
52 F. Supp. 2d at 443. SBCL provided clinical laboratory services throughout the United
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Merena became concerned about suspicious billing practices at
SBCL. After alerting federal officials and retaining counsel, Merena
met with federal officials and described the several fraudulent billings schemes he suspected were going on at SBCL.117
Three months after meeting with federal officials, Merena filed a
qui tam action under the FCA. Thereafter, Merena “spent literally
hundreds of hours assisting the Government.”118 Remaining employed at SBCL for eighteen months after he initially approached the
Government, Merena was able to supply the Government with documents,119 including SBCL’s internal directory of personnel and a
complete set of SBCL’s 1993 monthly billing and accounts receivable
reports.120 Once SmithKline learned that Merena was a whistleblower, “it no longer became practicable for him to keep his position.”121 Unable to find employment with other companies once his
whistleblower role became public, Merena and his family fell into
dire financial straits, depleting their savings for living expenses.122
In his meetings with Government attorneys and agents, Merena:
• explained how the various suspected fraudulent billing schemes worked;
• provided names of key individuals at SBCL, along
with a description of their duties,123 and his impression of which individuals would be most likely to cooperate with the Government;124
• provided “an overview of SBCL’s operations throughout the country”;
• explained SBCL’s computer billing system including
its “scheme of ‘jamming’ diagnosis codes, whereby
SBCL’s computer automatically added other diagnosis
codes for particular claims where specific diagnoses
are required”;125

States. Merena, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 360. Merena visited each of SBCL’s 27 laboratory sites
as part of his duties. Id.
117. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 442-44.
118. Id. at 442; Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 111, at 424-25.
119. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
120. Id. at 447.
121. Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 111, at 425.
122. Id.; Donna Shaw, A Year Later, Whistle-Blower Still Waits for His Millions, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 1, 1998, at A1.
123. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
124. Id. at 447.
125. Id. at 443.
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• assisted the Government in drafting document requests to SBCL;126
• “reviewed documents received from SBCL in response
to three subpoenas, two of which he was helpful in
preparing”;127
• explained “many of the internal documents [the Government] received . . . in response to the subpoenas”;128
• assisted FBI and LABSCAM Task Force agents in
preparing for interviews of witnesses “and in reviewing notes after the witness interviews.”129
In 1995, the Government began settlement negotiations with SBCL.
In 1996, it intervened in Merena’s qui tam action and reached a settlement of $325 million with SBCL.130 After two years of working
closely with Merena, the DOJ tried, unsuccessfully, to minimize his
contribution so it could pay less of the judgment to him. Merena ultimately received a relator’s award of $26 million, but not until there
had been three years of acrimonious litigation between the DOJ and
Merena.131
The DOJ and Merena disagreed over what portion of the settlement was eligible to calculate the relators’ share, whether the relators were jurisdictionally barred, which relators were eligible to
share in the judgment and, most significantly, the degree to which
the relators had contributed to the case.132 One year after the qui tam
case had been settled with the defendants, a seven-day hearing was
held in district court to determine Merena’s shares.133 At this hearing, various DOJ officials testified, apparently contradicting each
other as to the value of Merena’s contribution to the case.134 Clearly

126. Id. at 442-50.
127. Id. at 446.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 424; Shannon P. Duffy, SmithKline to Pay $335 Million in Whistleblower
Suit, 216 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1997, at 1.
131. United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352,
372 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Determination of Merena’s share of the settlement was heavily litigated with different offices within DOJ opposing each other regarding an appropriate percentage for Merena. Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 111, at 425-26.
132. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 430-54.
133. Id. at 429.
134. Merena worked primarily with attorneys and agents in the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 450. James Sheehan, chief, Civil Division,
for this office testified by deposition as to Merena’s assistance. Id. at 442-43. Carol Lam,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California, and Laurence Freedman, assistant director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, DOJ, also testified. According
to Mr. Freedman, “the Philadelphia Task Force did not even know much about the case.”
Id. at 445. According to the court:
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exasperated, the District Court, which found “that Mr. Merena contributed substantially and provided most of the information utilized
in the successful prosecution and settlement,”135 questioned the
DOJ’s motive and tactics:
I recognize that the government’s present litigation stance is that
Mr. Merena helped very little and merely provided basically clerical assistance that the government could have obtained without
him. In view of the many public accolades previously given him by
the same government officials responsible for the prosecution of
the case, I have trouble accepting or even rationalizing the government’s present position other than attributing it to an overzealous attempt to lower the amount of the award rightfully due.136

Note the remarkable aspects of this case: P (private party) and P’s
counsel worked extensively and candidly137 with R (regulator) prior to
the filing of P’s qui tam action; R broke its tradition of confidentiality
to work with P and P’s counsel to investigate the case; P worked with
R while P was still employed at T (targeted business), bringing R
helpful records and evidence;138 P provided R with expertise on a
complicated fraud; P and P’s counsel worked hand-in-hand with the
Government to investigate and prepare the case from the beginning

[T]he attorneys [from DOJ offices in] San Diego and Washington, DC . . . seek
to take far more credit for the overall success of the proceedings than is rightly
due. The suggestion has been presented that San Diego and Washington took
care of . . . the most valuable part of the case, and that the United States Attorney’s office in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, . . . through Mr. Sheehan . . . played only a minor part in bringing about the successful conclusion of
the actions. Perhaps the reason the litigation has been presented in this light is
because the contacts that Relator Merena . . . had with the Government was in
providing assistance . . . [to this district] and the Government wants to minimize the contributions of the Relators in order to lower their ultimate award.
Id. at 450.
135. Merena, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
136. Id. at 370.
137. Candor with R by P and P’s counsel is essential, as explained by an experienced
relator’s counsel: “To work successfully, the relators must be totally candid with the government agents.” William J. Hardy, A Relator Counsel Perspective, 10 TAF Q. REV 14, 14
(1997).
138. In other cases, P’s who are still employed at T have worn recording equipment,
providing taped conversations as evidence. Federal agents (referring to conversations
taped by another relator while that relator was still employed at defendant’s offices) discussed the contribution such evidence has to building a case:
[I]f possible, it is important to become involved covertly as soon as practicable,
while the conspiracy is still forming, to make evidence gathering more effective.
Furthermore, experience has also shown that traditional “paper trail” white
collar cases are very complicated and difficult to present to a jury. “Tape cases,”
on the other hand, are more attractive to prosecutors and easier for juries to
follow. Thus, time can really be of the essence in these matters where the
fraudulent activity is ongoing.
T. Clay Mason & Larry D. Leonard, A Government Investigator Perspective, 10 TAF Q.
REV. 10, 12 (1997).
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of the case until its settlement;139 for years after working cooperatively, R and P litigated bitterly over what should be the relators’
share.140 As Merena demonstrates, the FCA alters the relationship
between private individuals and public regulators and produces dynamics unlike anything else in regulatory theory or practice.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GAME THEORY
A. But First, a Personal Note
Before delving into Game Theory and the insights it provides to
the changing dynamics created by the FCA, I should state that I
came to Game Theory intrigued and skeptical. I am now a convert.
I was intrigued because I had a sense that Game Theory was an
ideal analytical tool for examining any far-ranging public policy initiative. As a federal prosecutor, I had seen first-hand the strengths
and weaknesses of the two-player regulatory model and saw the
practical and significant changes in this two-player regulatory game
brought by the FCA. I suspected that Game Theory was an ideal perspective for examining any policy initiative that altered dynamics
among participants.
I came to Game Theory quite skeptical, however, because it
seemed to me that Game Theory was nothing more than a selffulfilling prophecy where the outcome of any game is determined by
benefit-cost values arbitrarily assigned to each player’s moves. As I
used Game Theory analysis to play games of regulation, watching
how they were influenced by the introduction of the FCA, I came to
realize that by calculating and justifying the benefits and costs I attributed to various moves of the players, my analysis became more
precise, thoughtful, and thorough. The rigor Game Theory imposed
provided innumerable, significant insights. I became a Game Theory
convert.
B. Overview of Game Theory
Developed in the early and mid-twentieth century by a mathematician, John von Neumann, and an economist, Oskar Morgenstern,141
139. After settlement this cooperation fell apart as one office within the DOJ opposed
another when determining Merena’s appropriate share of the judgement. Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 111, at 425-26; Tom Lowry, Whistleblowers, Justice Clash Over Settlements, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 1998, at B3; Donna Shaw, Dispute over Whistle-Blowers’ Fees
Hits Court, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 19, 1998, at C01; Donna Shaw, Judge Boosts Reward in
Fraud Cause to $52 Million, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 9, 1998, at A01.
140. See Merena, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 352; United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
141. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953).
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Game Theory is a method for studying how people make decisions.142
Game Theory arises from the notion that routinized, describable habits and behaviors govern day-to-day interactions, much as rules govern parlor games such as bridge and poker.143 Like other “rational
choice” theories, Game Theory assumes that decision-makers are rational actors who pursue their self-interest.144 Game Theory also assumes that when determining their strategy, actors take into account
what they expect other rational, self-interested decision-makers will
do.145 Like all economic modeling, Game Theory simplifies social
situations and offers insights from such simplification.146
Game Theory relies upon key concepts to examine decisions people make. A normal form game (also called a strategic form of a
game) is the simplest model of interaction.147 It has three elements:
(1) players, (2) strategies available to players, and (3) payoffs players
receive for each strategy or combination of strategies players pursue.148 While strategies are courses of conduct that are physically possible, payoffs are the consequences of actions. An example of a normal form, two-player game is a child (Player One) and a parent
(Player Two) and the child’s effort to get cookies before a meal. The
payoff for the child is getting cookies before dinner; the payoff for the
parent is having the child come to dinner with a healthy appetite.
The child’s decision to eat cookies before dinner probably will be influenced by his expectation of what his parent will do if she finds out
the child has eaten cookies before dinner. The child will adopt different strategies (bargaining for cookies or sneaking cookies) based
upon his expectations of his parent’s strategy (willing to agree to a
compromise of two cookies or standing firm and imposing punishment for eating pre-dinner cookies).
Whereas a normal form game describes the situation where players are making simultaneous decisions, an extensive form game assumes the parties will interact over time.149 The elements of an extensive form game are (1) players, (2) when each player can act, (3)
strategies are available to a player whenever it is time for the player

142. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
158-66 (1991); POSNER, supra note 15, at 19-23; see also AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 1-4 (1991).
143. MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY (rev. ed. 1983).
144. ELLICKSON, supra note 142, at 156-59; POSNER, supra note 15, at 19-23.
145. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION vii (1984); ELLICKSON, supra
note 142, at 156-64; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 1; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11-12 (1994).
146. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 7; ELLICKSON, supra note 142, at 157.
147. OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3.
148. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 7-8.
149. Id. at 52; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3.
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to act, (4) information a player has about other players when it is
time for the player to act, and (5) payoffs to each player.150
Parties in games may have complete information (they know who
the other players are, and the strategies and payoffs available to all
players), or incomplete information (lacking some of the above).151
When a player has complete information but does not know which
strategy the other player will choose, she has complete but imperfect
information. When a player has complete information and knows
which strategy the other player will choose, she has complete and
perfect information.152 Games are zero-sum when one player wins
only if the other party loses (baseball, poker, etc.). Games are nonzero-sum if all players can win (a teacher and a student both win
when the student learns his math). Non-zero-sum games work because players have the same goal.153
Solution concepts are general principles of behavior that tend to
govern and predict, which strategies a player will choose. Legal rules
can provide players with solution concepts.154 For example, the legal
rule that those caught stealing another’s property could go to jail
may affect an actor’s decision whether to steal if given the opportunity to do so.
The Nash Equilibrium is a solution concept that states that each
player will choose a strategy that is best for that player given the fact
that other players are also choosing strategies that are best for
them.155 Stated another way, the Nash Equilibrium requires that
players, when choosing their best strategy, take into account what
other players are likely to do.
Here is an example of the Nash Equilibrium. Assume that A, B,
and C belong to a club of fifty members. Also assume that A, B, and
C all wish to run for the presidency of the club at an upcoming election. Further assume that A, B, and C discuss their presidential ambitions before the election and realize that all three will probably pull
support from the same thirty club members, with the remaining
twenty members voting for D, the sole other candidate for club presidency. A, B, and C recognize that if all three campaign for the presi150. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 51; HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING
10-11 (2000).
151. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 10; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3;
cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 188 (2000).
152. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 10; DAVIS, supra note 143, at 9.
153. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 43; DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 142, at 13-14;
ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO, THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY 5-10 (2000).
154. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 11, 24-31.
155. John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 155-62
(1954); cf. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 19-28; DAVIS, supra note 143, at 119-23; DIXIT &
NALEBUFF, supra note 142, at 74-80; GINTIS, supra note 150, at 6; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN,
supra note 15, at 155-57.
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dency, they will split the votes among their supporters, and all will
lose, with the result that D will be elected. Realizing this, A, B, and C
agree that their best, collective strategy is to decide which of them
will run for president, which will run for president-elect, and which
will run for secretary-treasurer (and we will assume, by tradition,
move up to president-elect the next year). Having made their decision, A, B, and C campaign accordingly. Each is elected to the position campaigned for and their desired result is achieved: D is defeated and A, B, and C are elected to the three officer positions, securing the presidency among them for the next three election cycles.
Game Theory analysis begins with a triggering event, then assesses the possible strategies of all players in responding to the
event. Each player’s benefits and costs are calculated for each strategy. In short, Game Theory is simply a disciplined way of assessing
the benefits and costs of the choices one faces.
C. The “Games” Played in This Article
Using the above Game Theory concepts, we will examine how the
introduction of the FCA alters the regulatory game. We will analyze
two Games: Game One is without the FCA; Game Two is with it. The
Games we will analyze are extensive form games since the parties
make their decisions over time, rather than simultaneously. The
players are R (public regulators), T (targeted business), and P (private individuals with inside information). The Games are repeated
games or iterated, since at least one player, R, and possibly another,
P’s counsel, will interact repeatedly.
In these Games, the players have incomplete, imperfect information. No player has complete information about who the other players
are (for example, more defendants could surface as an investigation
proceeds) or when the other players can act. The players know that
there are limited strategies available to each player (essentially, cooperate with regulators, or not). It is reasonable to assume that players have complete information about the payoffs facing each player
(there aren’t many options for payoffs: a finding of liability on the
part of T with resulting payoffs to R and P, or a finding of no liability
for T, which is a payoff for T). Players almost certainly do not have
complete information as to what other players know about each
other. In fact, T, and possibly P, may try to conceal facts. It is also
unlikely that R will reveal to either T or P all relevant information it
has.
As between P and R, the Games are most likely non-zero-sum
since P and R share at least one common goal: establishing T’s liability. However, if this goal changes (for example, R may decide that it
is in the public interest to dismiss P’s case or R may seek to limit the

628

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:603

percentage of award P gets), the Game between P and R becomes
zero-sum. If either P or R wins, the other loses. The game between R
and T rarely will be anything but zero-sum since a finding of liability
on the part of T is almost always the only way R wins.
For purposes of these Games, we will make three major assumptions. First, we will assume that R is honest, competent, and acting
in the public interest. We make this assumption not for normative
reasons but because it is necessary. Doing otherwise introduces infinite permutations into the Games, making it impossible to generalize
behavior. Second, we will assume that T, a public company, has actually engaged in significant wrongdoing, namely, that T has concealed its true financial status from lenders and investors in public
reports by falsifying expenses. Again, this is not a normative statement about wrongdoing by regulated industries, but necessary for
our discussion. Lastly, we shall assume that approximately twentyseven percent of the information about T’s wrongdoing that P supplies to R is helpful to R.156
Game theory employs an inverted tree diagram to illustrate an extensive form game where the branches represent different strategies
available to each player. There are six diagrams in Appendix B that
illustrate the two Games we are playing. For ease of discussion, each
Game is diagramed from only one player’s perspective. Thus, in
Game One, which is the regulatory game without the FCA, Game
1(A) views the game from R’s perspective; Game 1(B) views it from
T’s perspective; and Game 1(C) views it from P’s perspective. In
Game Two, which is the regulatory game with the FCA, Game 2(A)
views the Game from R’s perspective; Game 2(B) views it from T’s
perspective; and Game 2(C) views it from P’s perspective. Each tree
diagram reflects the strategies available to the player profiled. Following each diagram is a discussion of how the values at each point
156. Admittedly, twenty-seven percent is a rough approximation. It is calculated as follows: Historically the DOJ has intervened in twenty-three percent of qui tam cases. Presumably these are meritorious. In addition, relators have proceeded to judgment or settled
another two percent of qui tam cases (where the DOJ did not intervene). Letter from the
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Author, FOIA Request 145-F01-6072 (Oct. 20, 2001) (on file with
author). It is likely that not all two percent of these cases were meritorious but were settled for convenience. Thus these percentages should be discounted somewhat. It is also
probably true, however, that the DOJ has not intervened in every meritorious case and
that relators dismissed some meritorious cases after the DOJ elected not to intervene. This
conclusion is supported by the significant work relators and their counsel undertook to
convince the DOJ to intervene in some cases. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 4579 (discussing United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, 171 F. Supp. 2d
1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001), 92-101 (discussing the case of Lissack), 114-40 (discussing United
States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
This conclusion is also evidenced by the fact that experienced relators’ counsel often declined to proceed if the DOJ decided not to intervene. See Mitchell R. Kreindler, So You
Wanna Be a Whistleblower’s Lawyer? (Nov. 28, 2001) (unpublished paper presented at
A.B.A. National Institute on Civil False Claims Act and on file with author).
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of strategy (Node) were determined. The values are based upon the
significance of each benefit or cost, discounted by how speculative
that benefit or cost may be.
III. APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. Game 1(A): Regulatory Game Without the FCA: From R’s
Perspective
As noted, Game One is regulation without the presence of a
mechanism like the FCA that encourages private parties to bring information about wrongdoing to regulators and encourages these private parties to work with regulators to investigate and litigate such
wrongdoing. Game 1(A) looks at this regulatory Game from the perspective of regulators (R). The triggering event for Game 1(A) is R’s
obtaining information that T possibly is engaged in wrongdoing. We
will presume that this information is not extensive, detailed, or conclusive of wrongdoing. It is suggestive only, such as a significant drop
in stock price or high-profile and public resignations by key leadership within T for unexplained or suspicious reasons.157 From this
triggering event R has choices of strategies: whether to investigate T
(Nodes I and II), and whether to initiate action against T (Nodes III
and IV). At Node V, R wins, and at Node VI, R loses the action it initiated.158
1. Nodes I & II: Whether R Opens an Investigation of T
At Node I, R decides not to investigate T even though R has information that T is engaged in wrongdoing. There are legitimate reasons why R might make such a decision. R may determine, for example, that it cannot afford to allocate its scarce investigative resources
to investigate a business without more concrete information. This
leads to the first benefit R reaps with its decision not to investigate
T: R will save investigative resources that can be directed to other
investigations. There is another possible benefit. If T learns of R’s decision not to open an investigation, T could be deterred in continuing
its wrongdoing since T doesn’t want R to investigate it. If T knows
that T is on R’s radar screen, T may decide to cease wrongdoing and

157. Similar events preceded HealthSouth’s $1.4 billion scandal, HealthSouth Faked
$1.4 Billion Profits, The SEC Alleges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2002, at A1, and the bankruptcy of Enron. See also Matt Krantz, Peeling Back the Layers of Enron’s Breakdown,
USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at 1B; Jim Yardley, Critic Who Quit Top Enron Post is Found
Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at B1, B6. The seventh-largest commercial bankruptcy in
United States history, Enron’s downfall apparently was brought on by the company’s practice of hiding, from public scrutiny, millions of dollars of Enron debt on the books of offshore partnerships. The Enron Scandal, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at 3B.
158. See infra app. A, at 677-79 (describing charts 1-6 of Game 1(A)).
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not further pique R’s interest. Because both T’s awareness and T’s
response are speculative, this possible benefit is deemed to be minimal.
R’s decision not to investigate creates possible costs for R: (1) T
may be encouraged, if not emboldened, to continue its wrongdoing,
especially if T is aware of R’s decision not to investigate T; (2) R’s decision may give T time to revise and improve its fraud methodology,
allowing T to become even more sophisticated in committing and
concealing its wrongdoing; (3) If T is allowed to continue its wrongdoing and possibly expand it, more persons may become victims of T’s
fraud; and (4) If other businesses become aware of R’s decision not to
investigate T’s wrongdoing, they too will be encouraged to continue,
or commence, similar wrongdoing.
For these reasons, the costs of R’s decision not to investigate T
once R receives information that T is engaging in wrongdoing outweigh R’s benefit.159
At Node II, R opts for the opposite strategy: R decides to investigate T. By adopting this strategy, R obtains the converse of many of
the benefits and costs noted at Node I. Thus, R achieves the following
possible benefits: (1) R discourages T from engaging in at least some
of its wrongdoing. (2) R discourages other observant business from
engaging in wrongdoing. Businesses not already subject to investigation have reason to be concerned when another business in the same
industry comes under investigation,160 since often R expands its investigation of one business to include other similar businesses on the
assumption that they too are engaging in the same wrongdoing.161
Additional possible benefits accruing to R include: (3) Opening an investigation of T makes it difficult for T to continue refining its
wrongdoing methodology, and (4) makes it less likely T will expand
its wrongdoing to include more victims. (5) During its investigation of
T, R develops some institutional knowledge and expertise about T,
T’s industry, and the type of behavior T is engaging in. This knowl159. See infra app. A chart 1, at 677.
160. The “national initiative” undertaken by the United States Department of Health
and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (OIG), demonstrates this. For example, in
1996 the OIG sent a letter to the 125 teaching hospitals associated with all 125 academic
medical centers in the United States informing these hospitals that they were subject to an
audit of their teaching physicians’ Medicare Part B billings. This national initiative arose
after Medicare Part B irregularities were found at one such medical center, the University
of Pennsylvania. Pamela H. Bucy, The PATH from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching Hospitals, 44 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 3, 3-14 (2000).
161. Russell Hayman, Dissecting a Health Care Fraud Investigation, in HEALTH CARE
FRAUD & ABUSE: HOW TO NAVIGATE THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 223, 238-44 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1129, 1999) (reviewing regional and national
initiatives by federal regulators aimed at multiple health care providers), available at WL
1129 PLI/Corp 223.
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edge may be generic—how to more effectively investigate a general
type of wrongdoing—or specific to T or T’s industry. While such institutional knowledge could benefit R in future investigations, its value
is highly speculative since turnover at R could dissipate it. Thus, this
last benefit is minimal.
R also incurs costs with its decision to investigate T: (1) Because R has little information about T’s possible wrongdoing and
no inside information about it, R’s investigation will consume considerable resources. R’s investigation is also likely to be relatively
unfocused and inefficient with unlikely chance of uncovering the
full extent of T’s wrongdoing and all individuals who are involved.
(2) Because R’s resources are limited, R incurs an opportunity cost
when it directs its resources toward T. By spending scarce investigative resources on T, R will be unable to investigate other deserving targets.162 For these reasons, R’s benefits at Node II,
where R opts to investigate T, slightly outweigh R’s costs.163
2. Nodes III and IV: Whether R Initiates Action at the Conclusion
of Its Investigation of T
Whether R initiates action against T after completing its investigation of T depends upon whether R uncovered T’s wrongdoing. The
action R brings could be criminal, civil, administrative, or as minimal
as increasing R’s oversight of T.164 At Node III, R declines to initiate
action against T because R did not find T’s wrongdoing. At Node IV,
where R uncovers T’s wrongdoing, R initiates action.
The benefits for R at Node III of not initiating an action against T
are minimal: (1) R puts an end to R’s investigative costs; and (2) R
generates some institutional knowledge from its unsuccessful investigation of T.
The costs to R of closing its investigation of T without taking action are: (1) R has incurred investigative expenses without learning
about T’s wrongdoing; (2) R will not be able to protect victims who
162. Elizabeth Amon, White Collar Crime, Heat Going Up, NAT’L L.J., July 8, 2002, at
A15.
163. See infra app. A chart 2, at 677.
164. Because administrative sanctions such as exclusion from contracting with the federal government can effectively bankrupt a corporation, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7
(2002); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1–1001.3005 (2002); FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 47, § 5.01, some
types of administrative action can be quite draconian. Initiation of a punitive civil action
(such as filing a complaint under the False Claims Act) can also be an extremely severe
sanction because of the extraordinarily high damages and penalties such an action can
bring. Surprisingly perhaps, the least severe sanction, at least from a corporation’s point of
view, may be criminal prosecution. Although the consequences of a criminal conviction potentially can be harsh for a fictional entity (revocation of corporate charter or courtsupervised reorganization, for example), these are unlikely. Fines are more likely, and
these fines can be reduced significantly if a corporation cooperates with prosecutors.
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have been, are being, and likely will be hurt by T’s wrongdoing; (3)
R’s decision not to initiate action against T could damage R’s credibility as an effective regulator, perhaps even neutralizing much of the
deterrence R achieved at Node I when it opened an investigation of
T; (4) R’s decision may damage morale within R if the decision is
viewed as the result of incompetence, corruption, or inadequate resources, rather than merit. Given our assumption for these Games,
R’s employees and any other observers might believe that T is engaged in wrongdoing; and (5) By shutting down its investigation
without bringing charges, R signals to T that T can successfully
elude R.165
This last cost is incurred if T is aware that R was investigating it,
which is likely given the nature of fraud investigations. Unlike R’s
decision at Node I, where R only possibly signaled encouragement to
T by not investigating, R’s decision to close its investigation without
taking action against T almost certainly will send a signal of encouragement to T and other observant businesses. At Node I, when R
opted not to investigate T, it is unlikely that T or other businesses
knew of R’s decision. The decision not to investigate a possible target
is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion generally hidden deep
within the confines of R. In fact, it would be inappropriate for R to
publicize its decisions not to investigate an individual or business
since simply stating as much could disparage or defame targets.166 If
R actually opens an investigation of T, however, it is almost certain
that T, and possibly other businesses, will know that R was investigating T. It is also virtually certain that T will surmise R’s decision
to close its investigation without initiating action. During a typical
fraud investigation, subpoenas requiring document or witness production will be served on targets, obviously alerting targets that R is
investigating them.167 Almost certainly, T’s attorneys will engage in
discussions with R about document and witness productions.168 When
no more subpoenas come and no further R action occurs, T will correctly conclude that the matter has been resolved. Pursuant to T’s
165. Eric Posner discusses signaling, suggesting that in repeated games, participants
signal to other players their willingness to cooperate in the future games. POSNER, supra
note 151, at 18-22. According to Posner, signaling is an important way not only to enter relationships, but also to maintain them. Id. at 21. Even so, as Posner notes, “signals do not
work perfectly or even particularly well” because it is cheaper for some people to send signals than for others, and it can be difficult to get information about signals. Id. at 21-22;
see also id. at 18-22, 50-55, 70-72, 98-100, 127-28, 174-77. Ellickson also focuses on signals,
noting how Shasta County rural residents use signals to cooperate (follow social norms for
dealing with trespassing cattle). ELLICKSON, supra note 142, at 71-81.
166. See, e.g., PAMELA H. BUCY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, CASES AND MATERIALS 448 (2d
ed. 1998); United States v. Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
167. Hayman, supra note 161, at 225-26, 236-37.
168. See, e.g., Peter H. White, Let’s Make a Deal: Negotiating and Defending Immunity
for “Targets and Subjects”, 29 LITIG. 1, 44 (2002).
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request for notification by R of its status, T may even be told that it
is no longer a target of R. In this way R’s decision not to bring an action against T will signal to T and other observant businesses that T
can continue its wrongful activity. Signaling such encouragement obviously presents a significant cost.
For these reasons, the costs to R of closing its investigation without taking action against T outweigh the benefits.169
At Node IV, R initiates action against T after finding grounds to
do so during its investigation. The benefits of initiating action are: (1)
Enhanced credibility for R in the eyes of T and other businesses; (2)
Enhanced credibility in the eyes of T’s employees and competitors
who may have valuable evidence against T and are more willing to
come forward once R has initiated an action; (3) Enhanced morale
within R; (4) Ability to minimize, if not prevent, additional harm to
victims; (5) Deterrence of T’s wrongdoing;170 and (6) Deterrence of
wrongdoing by other observant businesses.
R incurs the following costs with its decision to initiate action
against T: (1) Because R lacks inside information about T’s wrongdoing—at least of the helpful type that a qui tam relator can provide—
R probably will not fully discover the scope of T’s wrongdoing. As a
result, R may not be successful, or as successful as it otherwise could
have been, in the legal action it initiates against T or in protecting
the public from T’s wrongdoing; and (2) Without inside information
about T’s wrongdoing such as who is involved, who might provide
evidence, what records are relevant, and where assets are located, R
will incur significant investigative and litigative costs in pursuing
the action it has initiated against T. R’s investigation, even if successful, will be inefficient, consuming unnecessary investigative resources.171
For the forgoing reasons, R’s benefits outweigh its costs in opting
to initiate an action against T at the conclusion of its investigation.172
3. Nodes V and VI: R Wins or Loses the Action It Brought
Against T
At Node V, R prevails in the action it initiated at Node IV. The
benefits R obtains are significant and obvious: (1) There will be a
public acknowledgment of T’s wrongdoing;173 (2) R’s victory will help

169. See infra app. A chart 3, at 678.
170. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1858-66
(2001).
171. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
172. See infra app. A chart 4, at 678.
173. Kevin J. O’Brien, Will There Be a Legal Legacy, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at A20
(referring to one of the DOJ’s purposes in prosecuting Arthur Andersen for obstruction of
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educate and inform the relevant industry as to what is permissible
behavior and what is not;174 (3) Collection of judgment, fines, or penalties. Almost certainly, T will make a significant payment to R (or
R’s umbrella organization, such as the federal government) in judgment, fines, or penalties; (4) T likely will cease committing its
wrongdoing (or at least as much of it as R has detected); (5) Other
observant businesses engaging in similar wrongdoing or contemplating doing so will be deterred; and (6) R’s credibility will be enhanced.
This may have several ripple effects. Citizens may become more willing to assist in future regulatory efforts overall or may become more
favorably disposed to regulators when sitting as jurors. More individuals may even become inclined to choose career paths at regulatory agencies.
R will incur costs even though R wins the action. These costs include: (1) The lost opportunity of pursuing other deserving T’s. Because of R’s limited resources, R’s decision to pursue T necessarily
means that R is unable to pursue other wrongdoers; and (2) Possibly,
an inability to recoup from T, R’s full investigative expenses. This
will, of course, depend upon T’s solvency and the priority of other T
creditors or victims.
For the reasons stated, R’s benefits outweigh R’s costs when R
wins the action it brought against T.175
At Node VI, R loses the action it initiated at Node IV. Surprising
perhaps, but there are two benefits to R from this adverse outcome.
One is certain, the others, speculative: (1) The certain benefit is that
with its loss, R’s investigative and litigative costs will end; and (2)
The possible benefits are that R will deter T and possibly other observant businesses from engaging in wrongdoing simply because
these entities want to avoid the tangible and intangible costs a business sustains in responding to R’s investigation, and in defending itself (albeit successfully) in the action R initiated against T. These
businesses may decide that such costs are so significant that they
will operate “cleaner” businesses in the future so that they do not
come under R’s investigative scrutiny.

justice as obtaining a “public admission by Andersen that it committed a crime in destroying Enron-related documents”).
174. If we were concerned with obvious forms of wrongdoing this would not be an issue.
Every legally sane person knows that rape, murder, robbery, and the like are wrong and
public prosecution of such behavior, while achieving other goals perhaps, does little to
communicate the wrongfulness of this conduct to possible future perpetrators. This is not
the case with economic wrongdoing, however, for often the line between aggressive business strategies and wrongdoing is not clear. Successful regulatory action, whether criminal, civil, or administrative, can help communicate where the line is and what conduct
crosses it.
175. See infra app. A chart 5, at 679.
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Not surprisingly, R’s costs at Node VI are significant: (1) R loses
credibility with the regulated industries, among R’s own employees
and among the general public; (2) R will have incurred substantial
investigative and litigative expense with no result; (3) R incurs opportunity costs since by allocating resources to pursue T, R is unable
to investigate other deserving targets; and (4) R’s loss in the action
almost certainly signals to T and other observant businesses two
things. First, if T’s targeted behavior was of ambiguous lawfulness,
R’s loss may communicate that such behavior is lawful.176 Second,
even if it is clear that T’s behavior was unlawful, R’s loss signals that
R is unable to successfully pursue such behavior and that businesses
may engage in it with impunity.
For these reasons, R’s costs are significant, and R’s benefits are
minimal when R loses the action it has brought against T.177
B. Game 1(B): Regulatory Game Without FCA: From T’s Perspective
Game 1(B) continues with a regulatory “Game” that does not include a mechanism such as the FCA which encourages private parties to bring information about T’s wrongdoing to regulators and to
work with regulators to investigate and litigate against T. In Game
1(B) this regulatory system is viewed from the perspective of T, the
targeted business. The triggering event for Game 1(B) is T’s commission of wrongdoing. T’s strategy options flow from this event: whether
T discloses its wrongdoing to R (Nodes I and II); whether T cooperates in the investigation that R opens (Nodes III and IV); whether T
cooperates with R after R initiates an action against T (Nodes V and
VI). At Nodes VII and VIII, T responds: at Node VII, T loses the action R initiated; at Node VIII, T prevails.178
1. Nodes I and II: Whether T Discloses Its Wrongdoing to R
T’s strategy at Node I, not to disclose its wrongdoing to R, may be
a rational option even though, as discussed infra,179 the consequences
of T’s wrongdoing can be mitigated considerably if T discloses its
wrongdoing to R before R discovers it. The reason non-disclosure may
be advantageous is because R may never discover T’s wrongdoing
even though R has been alerted to it. Or even if R discovers T’s
wrongdoing, it is not clear that R would respond with consequences.
It is possible that R would lose interest in T (if more egregious offenders came along to absorb R’s interest and resources), or that R’s

176.
177.
178.
179.

See supra note 164.
See infra app. A chart 6, at 679.
See infra app. B, at 699 (diagramming Game 1(B)).
See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
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priorities and personnel would change, focusing R’s attention on actors besides T.
If R never detects T’s wrongdoing or if R fails to respond if R does
learn of it, T reaps an obvious and substantial benefit by adopting a
strategy of non-disclosure:180 T (1) avoids a finding of culpability, (2)
avoids resulting sanctions, and (3) avoids the collateral consequences
that may flow from the imposition of sanctions. These collateral consequences likely include adverse publicity and adverse reaction by
T’s shareholders, lenders, or business associates.181
The costs to T of adopting a non-disclosure strategy are: (1) The
uncertainty of not knowing if, or when, R will learn of T’s wrongdoing—such uncertainty makes business planning and preparation difficult; (2) The likelihood that if R learns of T’s wrongdoing, R will impose greater sanctions on T than whatever R would have imposed
had T demonstrated good faith and corporate responsibility by disclosing its malfeasance before getting caught; and (3) T loses some
ability to control its fate by waiting to see if and when R does anything. By adopting a non-disclosure strategy, T is in the position of
reacting to R’s initiatives, leaving T with less ability to influence R’s
assessment of T’s liability, R’s view of appropriate sanctions, and the
collateral consequences that flow from sanctions.
The ability of targets to influence regulators is significant. If T
alerts R to T’s wrongdoing before R otherwise learns of it, T can possibly persuade R that T’s wrongdoing was less intentional than R
may assume. Especially in areas governed by complex rules and
regulations, T may be able to demonstrate to R that T’s conduct was
not the result of an intent to defraud, but resulted from a reasonable
interpretation of applicable rules. It is common, in complex corporate
investigations, for defense counsel to present T’s evaluation of R’s
case to R before R decides what action to take.182 If T’s counsel effectively demonstrates that there is a satisfactory explanation for T’s
behavior, showing it to be legitimate (or at least resulting from inno180. See generally Thomas E. Holliday & Charles J. Stevens, Disclosure of Results of
Internal Investigations to the Government or Other Third Parties, in INTERNAL CORPORATE
INVESTIGATIONS 279, 291-94 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003); Dennis
G. Kainen, When the IRS Comes Knocking, 29 LITIG. 40, 42 (2002); Shelly R. Slade, Truth
and Its Consequences: Should You Voluntarily Disclose Overbillings to Law Enforcement?,
12 HEALTH LAW., No. 5, 36, 37-39 (2000); Linda C. Quinn et al., Disclosing Bad News: An
Overview for Securities Counsel, in RESPONDING TO BAD NEWS: HOW TO DEAL WITH THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, STOCKHOLDERS, THE PRESS, ANALYSTS, REGULATORS AND THE
PLAINTIFFS’ BAR 329, 341 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1149
1999), available at WL 1149 PLI/Corp 329.
181. See infra note 182.
182. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 31, at 26; Hayman, supra note 161 at 237; Christopher
Myers et al., Warding Off Criminal Liability with an Effective Corporate Compliance Program, 29 LITIG. 69 (2002); United States ex rel. Grant v. Rush-Presbyterian/St. Luke’s
Med. Ctr., No. 99C06313, 2001 WL 40807, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16 2001).
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cent mistake rather than intentional misconduct), early dialog between R and T could influence R to close its investigation of T without bringing an action against T. Even if T cannot prevent R from
taking action completely, T may still be able to favorably influence
what action R will take, convincing R to return lesser charges
against T because of the good faith and corporate responsibility T has
shown by coming forward. (4) By adopting a non-disclosure policy, T
also foregoes the opportunity to influence the collateral consequences
of R’s action against T. T would like to impact the publicity that may
surround disclosure of T’s wrongdoing. Negative publicity can affect
T’s share value, which could lead to shareholder derivative suits,
class action fraud suits, and investigations by even more regulatory
agencies.183 Once they learn that an investigation is pending against
T, lenders or potential business partners of T may become reluctant
to deal with T because of the uncertainty such an investigation introduces about T’s ability to engage in future business endeavors.184
Some, perhaps many, of T’s personnel may become distracted by the
investigation or concerned about their job security. Some may choose
to leave T for other opportunities. Even choosing when T incurs adverse publicity can be important. By disclosing its wrongdoing on a
day dominated by other news or at a time that news media are not
likely to be attentive, T can minimize publicity. By disclosing its
wrongdoing at the same time T announces constructive responses to
such activity, T can favorably influence the content of publicity. By
alerting key business partners, lenders, and shareholders prior to
disclosure, T can minimize the disruption to its business that results
from publicity.

183. Bucy, supra note 20, at 62-64.
184. Id.; cf. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 47, § 6.05; Bucy, supra note 160, at 3, 12-14,
40-48. The experience of Dartmouth-Hitchcock, an academic medical center, demonstrates
the hardship businesses can face once they become subject to investigation. The Office of
Inspector General (OIG), Department of Health and Human Services informed Dartmouth
that it was being investigated for improperly billing Medicare for services rendered by
medical residents. It was given the choice of conducting its own audit under OIG supervision or paying for the OIG to conduct an audit. Dartmouth opted to conduct its own audit.
In ten months, after a review of about half of the sampled admissions, and a finding of no
billing errors, the OIG allowed Dartmouth to terminate its audit. By this point, Dartmouth
had spent approximately $1.7 million to conduct the audit. During the audit period,
planned expansion was delayed because of concerns by Dartmouth’s investment banker
and credit agency about the audit outcome. GENERAL ACCOUNTING SERVICES, REP. NO.
HEHS 98-174, MEDICARE CONCERNS WITH PHYSICIANS AT TEACHING HOSPITALS (PATH)
AUDITS 13-14 (1998). In another instance, St. Vincent’s Hospital, a suburban hospital in
Massachusetts, received a letter from the DOJ stating that a government audit indicated
that St. Vincent’s had submitted false claims to Medicare and was facing $2.6 million in
penalties and damages under the False Claims Act. The hospital, which processed more
than 80,000 claims totaling almost $300 million during the period in question, challenged
the DOJ’s audit, ultimately settling for $19,000. Bucy, supra note 20, at 63.
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Lastly, by deciding that it will not disclose its wrongdoing and
waiting to see if R discovers its wrongdoing, T also loses the opportunity to minimize, or at least manage, the resources T spends responding to R’s investigation and action. It can be enormously expensive to
defend against an investigation by R. There are significant out-ofpocket expenses in providing R with copies of records that R may
subpoena. Burdensome amounts of time of T’s employees and offices
may be consumed in responding to document requests, or in testifying or responding to interview requests. T may lose business opportunities because of the time its personnel are devoting to the investigation.
T can avoid many of these expenses, however, by disclosing its
wrongdoing. By opting to work with R to flesh out what wrongdoing
occurred, T can determine, to some extent, when and how it incurs
unavoidable litigation expenses. Such resource management includes
affecting when documents or individuals are produced, who within T
responds to R’s inquiries, and what business transactions T may pursue while the investigation is pending. An ability to manage the expenditure of its resources could prove quite valuable to T, since doing
so allows T to conduct its business with as little interruption as possible.
The costs to T of adopting a non-disclosure strategy depend, of
course, on the likelihood that T will get caught in the future. The
greater the chances of getting caught, the higher the costs to T in not
disclosing its wrongdoing. Assuming for purposes of this Game that
the chances are moderate to slim that R will discover T’s wrongdoing,
T’s benefits at Node I where T adopts a non-disclosure strategy outweigh, albeit barely, T’s costs.185
At Node II, T discloses its wrongdoing to R. By so doing, T obtains
the following benefits:186 (1) T ends the uncertainty of not knowing if
or when R will discover its wrongdoing; (2) T is able to influence R’s
assessment of T’s liability; (3) T almost certainly positions itself to
receive less onerous sanctions from R than it would receive if R discovered T’s wrongdoing itself; (4) T obtains the opportunity to spin its
wrongdoing in the most favorable light possible and thus influence
the collateral consequences that are likely to result from publicity
about T’s wrongdoing and R’s response to it; (5) T can minimize or at
least manage the resources it expends to respond to R’s investigation;
and (6) T can minimize any liability T, or T’s executives, incur for not

185. See infra app. A chart 7, at 680.
186. Cf. Myers et al., supra note 182, at 49, 51; Slade, supra note 180, at 36; Quinn et
al., supra note 180, at 341; Darryl Van Duch, Keeping a Boss Out of Trouble, NAT’L L. J.,
Feb. 5, 2001, at B1, B4.

2004]

GAME THEORY

639

disclosing wrongdoing. Certain criminal statutes and theories of liability make the knowing failure to disclose wrongdoing a crime.187
The costs to T of adopting a disclosure policy are: (1) Foregoing
the possibility that T gets away with its wrongdoing; (2) Incurring
the sanctions R will impose; and (3) Incurring the collateral consequences that flow from a finding of liability and resulting sanctions.
For these reasons, T’s benefits at Node II, where T opts to disclose its wrongdoing to R, exceed T’s costs.188
2. Nodes III and IV: Whether T Cooperates with R when R Opens
an Investigation of T
T’s next strategy choices, at Nodes III and IV, depend upon what
R does. Obviously, T’s prior options, to disclose or not to disclose its
wrongdoing to R, continue if, for whatever reason, R does nothing to
investigate T after receiving information of T’s possible wrongdoing.
It is when R opens an investigation of T that T faces its new decision:
whether to cooperate with R in its investigation.
At Node III, T can achieve three possible benefits by choosing a
non-cooperation strategy. Without T’s cooperation, R will have to find
and prove T’s wrongdoing by itself and R may not uncover T’s wrongdoing or may not uncover all of it. Thus, non-cooperation would allow
T to: (1) avoid a finding of culpability; (2) avoid sanctions; and (3) to
avoid the collateral consequences of such sanctions.
However, T incurs possible costs by adopting a non-cooperation
strategy: (1) Because of our assumption for these Games that T is
engaging in wrongdoing, T faces the prospect that R will uncover all
of T’s wrongful conduct during R’s investigation. This prospect could
disrupt T’s future planning; (2) T loses the opportunity to influence
R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) T loses the opportunity to affect
the sanctions R seeks; (4) T loses the opportunity to impact the collateral consequences, such as publicity, that flow from R’s investigation of T; and (5) T loses the opportunity to control, or minimize, the
resources T will spend in responding to R’s investigation.
For the above reasons, T’s costs significantly outweigh T’s benefits
when T adopts a non-cooperation strategy after R has opened an investigation of T.189
187. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3) (2002), creates a felony offense to conceal
or fail to disclose the fact that one may have improperly received Medicare payments in the
past. See, e.g., FABRIKANT ET AL, supra note 47, §2.02[5]; Gary C. Lynch & Eric F.
Grossman, Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing, in RESPONDING TO BAD NEWS: HOW TO
DEAL WITH THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, STOCKHOLDERS, THE PRESS, ANALYSTS,
REGULATORS AND THE PLAINTIFF’S BAR 207, 211 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Series No. B. 1149, 1999), available at WL 1149 PLI/Corp 207; Slade, supra note 180, at 36.
188. See infra app. A chart 8, at 680.
189. See infra app. A chart 9, at 681.
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At Node IV, T opts to cooperate with R during R’s investigation of
T. This cooperation could be anything from simple civility in producing whatever R requires to fully disclosing any and all suspected
wrongdoing.
T obtains the following possible benefits by cooperating with R: (1)
T is able to make a more informed decision about future strategies.
By cooperating with R, T is likely to learn what aspects of T’s business R is focusing on, and much about R’s commitment to the case
and resources available to pursue it;190 (2) T may be able to influence
R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) T may be able to obtain less onerous sanctions. Even if T cannot convince R that T is not culpable, T
may be able to influence R’s decision as to what sanctions it will seek
against T once it is determined that T is culpable; (4) T may be able
to influence the collateral consequences that befall T because of R’s
finding of culpability and imposition of sanctions; and (5) By cooperating with R during R’s investigation of T, T may be able to reduce or
at least manage the resources it expends when responding to R’s investigation.
It should be noted when assessing the benefit to T of cooperating
with R, once R has opened an investigation, that the earlier T begins
cooperating, the more T benefits. If T waits until R’s investigation is
almost complete, R is more likely to view T’s cooperation as pure expediency, not indicative of good faith or contrition. Also, the later T
begins cooperating, the less valuable to R is T’s cooperation since R
has already expended resources that could have been conserved if T
had cooperated earlier. Lastly, T will not be able to develop as much
of a rapport with R if T waits until most opportunities for dialog have
passed.
The costs to T of cooperating with R once R has initiated action
against T are: (1) T almost certainly will have to cease its wrongdoing, which presumably has been lucrative for T or T would not have
been doing it; and (2) Although it may be able to minimize and manage the resources it devotes to responding to R’s action, T will still
expend significant resources.
For the above reasons, T’s benefits outweigh T’s costs when T
adopts a strategy of cooperating with R during R’s investigation of
T.191

190. Cf. Hayman, supra note 161, at 227 (“Understanding the type and status of the
investigation will inform the provider as to its best response. Identifying the likely violation in the government’s eyes will greatly assist counsel’s efforts to identify the nature and
likely scope of the investigation.”).
191. See infra app. A chart 10, at 681.

2004]

GAME THEORY

641

3. Nodes V and VI: Whether T Cooperates with R Once R Initiates
Action Against T
At Node V, where T adopts a non-cooperation strategy with R once
R has initiated an action against T, T obtains two benefits: (1) T
forces R to prove its case against T. If R is unable to do so without T’s
cooperation, T escapes liability and all of the consequences that flow
from such a finding; and (2) T can learn much about R’s case against
T when R files its action: what R knows, and doesn’t know, what resources R is willing to allocate to pursue T.192 Such information will
allow T to make more informed decisions about T’s optimal strategies
from this point forward.
The costs to T of pursuing a non-cooperation strategy once R has
initiated action against it are: (1) Uncertainty in not knowing how
the action will be resolved and difficulty in planning given such uncertainty; (2) T’s lost opportunity to affect R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) T’s lost opportunity to affect the severity of sanctions R
will seek; (4) T’s lost opportunity to affect the collateral consequences
that flow from the sanctions R will seek; and (5) T’s lost opportunity
to minimize and manage the resources T expends in responding to
R’s action. Although these are the same types of costs T encountered
at Node III when T opted not to cooperate with R’s investigation,
each of these costs will increase once R has filed an action against T
for the simple reason that when R’s case progresses from investigation to action, T has forever lost opportunities to influence R.
For these reasons, T’s costs significantly outweigh T’s benefits in
Game One when T adopts a non-cooperation strategy with R when R
initiates an action against T.193
T reaps the following benefits at Node VI by adopting a cooperation strategy with R after R initiates an action against T: (1) An enhanced ability to make decisions about T’s future strategies since T is
now more informed about what R knows or doesn’t know, how strong
R’s case is against T, and what resources R is willing to devote to
pursuing the action against T; (2) Ability to influence R’s assessment
of T’s culpability; (3) Ability to influence R’s selection of sanctions
against T; (4) Ability to manage the collateral consequences of the
sanctions R seeks against T; and (5) Ability to minimize and manage
the resources T expends in responding to R’s action.
Although these are the same types of benefits T experienced when
T made the decision to cooperate with R when R was just opening its
investigation of T, the value of these benefits to T is different. The
first benefit, T’s enhanced ability to make decisions, increases in

192. See infra app. A chart 11, at 682.
193. Id.
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value. Now that R’s investigation has crystallized into specific
charges, transactions, and defendants, T has quite detailed information from which it can make decisions about future strategies. The
next set of benefits: T’s ability to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability, R’s selection of sanctions, the collateral consequences of R’s
sanctions, and the resources T spends in responding to R’s action, are
worth less to T if T has only begun cooperating with R after R’s initiation of an action against T. As noted in the earlier discussion regarding the value of T’s cooperation with R after R opens an investigation of T,194 R will not be as impressed by T’s cooperation since R
has already expended resources T could have helped conserve if T
had cooperated earlier. T’s cooperation is likely to be viewed by R as
expediency, not indicative of contrition and good faith, and thus, T
has lost significant opportunities to influence R’s future decisions regarding T.
T’s costs of cooperating with R once R has initiated an action
against T are: (1) T will have to stop or significantly curtail its
wrongdoing. Presumably this will be to T’s detriment since, otherwise, T would not have been engaging in such wrongdoing; and (2) T
will expend resources in responding to R’s investigation.
For the above reasons, T’s benefits outweigh T’s costs when T
opts to cooperate with R.195
4. Nodes VII and VIII: Whether T Wins or Loses the Action R Has
Brought Against T
Surprising perhaps, but T obtains some benefits at Node VII
where T loses the action R has brought against T: (1) T sees an end to
the tangible and intangible costs it was incurring in litigating the action against R; (2) T sees an end to the uncertainty in which it has
operated because of R’s ongoing investigative and litigative efforts
toward T; and (3) The unfavorable outcome in R’s action against T
may cause beneficial changes in T, such as corporate restructuring or
dismissal of culpable or ineffective leaders.196
T’s costs when losing the action R has brought are substantial: (1)
Although resolution of the case will end the immediate costs T was
spending to defend the action, there may be lingering effects from
those costs. Reputational or morale damage, or lost or aborted business opportunities, for example, could have lasting effects on T’s productivity; and (2) There will be sanctions against T. These probably

194. See supra Part III.B.2. at 640.
195. See infra app. A chart 12, at 682.
196. Cf. Interview with Neil V. Getnick, Partner, Getnick & Getnick, in New York,
N.Y. (July 15, 1992), in CORP. CRIME REP., July 27, 1992, at 17-20 [hereinafter Getnick Interview].
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will include fines,197 payment of damages and penalties,198 and implementation of costly internal structures, such as extensive corporate compliance plans.199
For the above reasons, T’s costs in losing the action R has brought
against it outweigh the minimal benefits T reaps.200
T’s benefits at Node VIII where T prevails in the action R brings
against T are significant: (1) Most obviously, T avoids the sanctions
and the collateral consequences of sanctions, that would result from
being found liable; (2) T’s victory may enhance its reputation as a
winner, which may help T in future dealings with R, or with other Ts
on transactions unrelated to the action with R; (3) If the alleged
wrongdoing on the part of T was of an ambiguous nature (Was there
malfeasance or simply aggressive but permissible business tactics?),
T’s victory at Node VIII may be viewed as an imprimatur that such
conduct is permissible; and (4) T achieves an end to the uncertainty
that has lingered over T’s business since R initiated its investigation.
T obtains one possible cost even though it has prevailed in the action: T may suffer from some lingering effects from defending itself in
the investigation and action. For the above reasons, T’s benefits outweigh T’s costs when T wins the action R has brought against it.201
C. Game 1(C): Regulatory Game Without the FCA: From P’s
Perspective
Game 1(C), from P’s perspective, is the last view of Game One.
The triggering event is P’s knowledge of T’s wrongdoing. From this
event, P has three, limited choices. At Node I, P chooses to do nothing with the information of T’s wrongdoing. At Node II, P reports the
wrongdoing internally within T. At Node III, P reports T’s wrongdoing externally to sources such as the media, congressional committees, or additional regulatory agencies. P can pursue the strategies at
Node II and Node III simultaneously.202
1. Node I: P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T’s Wrongdoing
The benefits to P of doing nothing upon learning of T’s wrongdoing
are: (1) P will not precipitate retaliation by T; and (2) P will not incur

197. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8, pt. C, Fines (Nov. 2003), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/2003guid/tabcon03_1.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
198. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2002).
199. Slade, supra note 180, at 40-41; Kirk S. Jordan & Joseph E. Murphy, Compliance
Programs: What the Government Really Wants, in 1 CORP. COMPLIANCE 529, 554-68 (2000).
200. See infra app. A chart 13, at 683.
201. See infra app. A chart 14, at 683.
202. See infra app. B, at 700 (diagramming Game 1(C)).
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any personal or professional consequences from reporting T’s wrongdoing.
The costs to P of adopting a do-nothing strategy are: (1) T’s
wrongdoing, if left to continue, may undermine T’s existence, and
thus, P’s professional security; (2) If T’s wrongdoing comes to light
through avenues besides P, P may be held accountable, in whole or in
part, for T’s malfeasance. This is more likely if P is highly-placed
within T. Such culpability could be alleged in shareholder derivative
actions, civil suits for fraud, or even criminal prosecutions;203 and (3)
P may experience personal angst for failing to report T’s wrongdoing,
especially if many innocent people are victimized by the wrongdoing.
This last cost will vary considerably depending upon P’s personality,
the extent to which the wrongdoing will harm individual victims, and
P’s awareness of such harm. This cost is quite speculative and thus,
is discounted.
For the above reasons, the benefits to P of adopting a do-nothing
strategy outweigh P’s costs.204
2. Node II: P Reports T’s Wrongdoing Internally
This Node assumes that P is either an employee of T (likely) or at
the least, an insider in T’s industry (perhaps a competitor or vendor
to T). Realistically, P will fit into one of these roles or would not have
access to significant information about T’s wrongdoing.205
P’s benefits at Node II, where P reports T’s wrongdoing internally,
are: (1) Possibly preventing greater troubles for T in the future.206 If
T responds to P’s internal whistleblowing by remedying the problem
P identifies, T may be able to avoid future harm to victims, competitors, or business associates, as well as future complaints, lawsuits,
and regulatory actions; (2) By reporting the problem, P may be
viewed within T as demonstrating leadership. This is especially true
if higher management was truly unaware of the wrongdoing and a
culture of compliance pervades T. If P’s action is viewed favorably, P
may advance within T or within the relevant industry; and (3) By reporting the wrongdoing, P may minimize the psychological angst P
would have experienced in not taking action that could prevent others, perhaps many others, from becoming victims. The value of this
benefit increases if the harm to victims is significant, but is speculative since it is difficult to know how various Ps will respond.
203. See, e.g., White, supra note 168, at 44.
204. See infra app. A chart 15, at 684.
205. BOESE, supra note 20, § 4.01[B].
206. Christopher A. Myers, An Effective Compliance Program Can Save Companies
Money and Keep Executives Out of Jail, 10 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 10 (June 2002); cf. Getnick Interview, supra note 196, at 17-20 (July 27, 1992) (discussing how businesses can
become more profitable by actively self-monitoring fraud and wrongdoing by employees).
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P’s costs at Node II are: (1) Possible retaliation by T and/or the
relevant industry;207 (2) P’s time and energy in reporting T’s conduct;
and (3) P’s personal and professional hardships that result from reporting the wrongdoing.208
For the above reasons, P’s benefits and costs neutralize each
other.209
3. Node III: P Reports Externally
At Node III, P reports T’s wrongdoing externally to sources such
as the press, professional self-policing organizations, or regulatory
bodies. The benefits to P of adopting this strategy are: (1) Possible
prevention of future problems for T; (2) P demonstrates leadership
207. Job loss is probably the most consistently identified consequence of blowing the
whistle, although whistleblowers may experience informal repercussions short of job loss,
or prior to job loss, such as isolation, abuse, forced psychiatric referral, impossible demands
by supervisors, threats of defamation or disciplinary actions, demotion, or reassignments.
See, e.g., MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 79-80 (1992);
Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 905, 953-58; K. Jean Lennane, Whistleblowing: A Health Issue, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 667, 668-69 (1993); Alan F. Westin, Conclusion: What Can and Should Be Done to Protect Whistle Blowers in Industry, in WESTIN, supra note 6, at 132-33 (1981); see also Clyde H. Farnsworth, Survey of Whistle Blowers, 133
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 7, 1987, at 3. Philip H. Jos et al., In Praise of Difficult People: A
Portrait of the Committed Whistleblower, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 552, 552-54 (1989).
In a study of thirty-five whistleblowers, thirty-four suffered retribution from their employer. Lennane, supra, at 668. The one exception was an individual who had not been
working for the organization he informed upon. Id. Of the thirty-four whistleblowers studied, eight were dismissed, fifteen were pressured to resign, three saw their position abolished, five were transferred to another town, and one was pressed to “take redundancy.”
Id.
208. Surveys of whistleblowers consistently show the hardship and retribution these
individuals experience. For example, in one survey of ninety whistleblowers, fifty-four percent said they were harassed at work, eighty-two percent were harassed by superiors,
eighty percent reported physical deterioration following their whistleblowing experience,
and eighty-six percent reported “negative emotional consequences, including feelings of
depression, powerlessness, isolation, anxiety and anger.” Farnsworth, supra note 207, at 3.
Insiders who remain employed after blowing the whistle do not usually last long at work.
It becomes too miserable. They face ostracism, hostility, rejection, and taunting by coworkers. See, e.g., Leo Kohls, Refusing to Drive Unsafe Vehicles, in WESTIN, supra note 6,
at 95-97; Henry I. Kurtz, Asserting Professional Ethics Against Dangerous Drug Test, in
WESTIN, supra note 6, at 107-08; Robert Lipsyte, What Happens After the Whistle Blows?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002, at D1.
In addition to immediate, tangible repercussions, there are cultural disincentives to providing information about wrongdoing by others. Whistleblowers often face ostracism from
long-time friends and colleagues once it becomes known that they have volunteered information of wrongdoing. Albert D. Clark, Ethical Implications of Whistle Blowing, 42 LA.
BUS. J. 364, 365 (1994) (terming whistleblowers as “rats” and “snitches”); Farnsworth, supra note 207, at 3 (calling whistleblowers “tattlers”); David Kocieniewski, Officer Says He
Was Hurt for Aiding an Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1996, at L25 (terming whistleblowers
as “cheese eaters”); Jacqueline P. Taylor, The World of Whistleblowers: Are They Sinners or
Saints?, (Feb. 2, 1998), at http://www.womenofcolorado.com/Articles/le020 298.asp (calling
whistleblower’s M&M’s).
209. See infra app. A chart 16, at 684.
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and advances within T; and (3) P minimizes or prevents P’s personal
angst. These are the same benefits P realized when reporting T’s
wrongdoing internally. When P reports T’s wrongdoing externally,
however, there are additional benefits: (4) By reporting T’s wrongdoing publicly, P more convincingly demonstrates P’s non-culpability
for the wrongdoing; (5) P may obtain protection from T’s retaliation
because T will look guilty and vindictive if T retaliates against P after P has publicly disclosed T’s wrongdoing; and (6) T may be more
eager to cease its wrongdoing and quickly repair the damage it has
created because of the publicity P’s external disclosure has brought.
The costs to P of reporting T’s wrongdoing externally are: (1) P increases the likelihood of ostracization, if not retaliation, within T and
within the relevant industry. The accompanying personal or professional hardships for P could be significant;210 (2) P’s time and energy;
and (3) Depending on the amount of publicity P’s disclosure generates, T’s response, and P’s personality, P may feel discomfort at becoming a public figure, especially if T responds to P’s external reporting by publicly disparaging P.211
For the above reasons, P’s benefits outweigh P’s costs when P opts
to report T’s wrongdoing externally.212
D.

Game 2(A): Regulatory Game with the FCA: From R’s Perspective

In Game Two, there is a mechanism, such as the FCA, that encourages private parties (P) to bring information about wrongdoing
to regulators and to work with regulators to investigate and litigate
such wrongdoing. Game 2(A) looks at this regulatory game from the
perspective of regulators (R). The triggering event, as in Game 1(A),
is R’s knowledge of T’s possible wrongdoing. Unlike Game 1(A), however, R learns of T’s possible wrongdoing in Game 2(A) from P. Also,
unlike the sketchy, inconclusive information R received in Game 1(A)
about T’s wrongdoing, P provides R with detailed information of T’s
wrongdoing since, as noted supra, the FCA requires that relators
provide the DOJ with a copy of the complaint P has filed (under seal)
against T, as well as all information and evidence P has regarding
T’s wrongdoing.213
From this triggering event, R has two choices: conduct a minimal
investigation (Node I), or a thorough investigation (Node II). Note
that R’s options vary from Game One where R had the choice of
whether to open an investigation or not. In Game Two, where the

210.
211.
at 35.
212.
213.

See supra notes 202-05.
Joseph Rose, Reporting Illegal Campaign Contributions, in WESTIN, supra note 6,
See infra app. A chart 17, at 685.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2002).

2004]

GAME THEORY

647

FCA is part of the regulatory scheme, R has a statutory obligation to
investigate P’s information once P has served R as required.214 After
R has conducted its investigation, R has two choices: decline to intervene in P’s lawsuit (Node III), or intervene in P’s lawsuit (Node IV).
If R intervenes, both R and P achieve benefits or incur costs, depending on the outcome in the action brought against T. At Node V, R and
P win the action, and at Node VI, R and P lose the action.215
1. Nodes I and II: How Much of an Investigation R Should
Conduct upon Learning from P of T’s Possible Wrongdoing
In Game Two, at Node I where R opts to conduct a minimal investigation of P’s information that T is engaged in wrongdoing, R obtains the following benefits: (1) If T knows that R is aware of T’s
wrongdoing, T may be deterred from continuing it. Because both T’s
awareness and T’s response are speculative, this is deemed to be a
minimal benefit; and (2) By conducting only a minimal investigation,
R saves resources that could be directed to other investigations.
Given the complexity of economic wrongdoing in general, and the
type of wrongdoing the FCA is aimed at in particular—government
contracting fraud—the amount of R’s resources needed to investigate
P’s information could be considerable because it takes significant
time and sophistication to investigate such complex malfeasance.216
On the one hand, because of our assumption for these Games that T
is engaged in wrongdoing and thus a worthy target of R’s investigatory resources, this would seem to be a minimal benefit. On the other
hand, it is not clear that P’s information is helpful in identifying T’s
wrongdoing. In fact, given our estimate that Ps are helpful to R only
twenty-seven percent of the time,217 R could waste considerable resources investigating P’s information.
This situation—P dictating who and what R investigates—
demonstrates both the strength and weakness of the FCA paradigm.
The strength is that the FCA enlists a new player, P, who potentially
brings the valuable resource of inside information to regulatory efforts. The weakness is that this new player forces R to play and to invest resources that could be better allocated elsewhere.218 One way to
214. Id.
215. See infra app. B, at 701 (diagramming Game 2(A)).
216. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care
Providers, 67 N.C. L. REV. 855, 875-81, nn.156-58 & 172 (1989); Bucy, Information as a
Commodity, supra note 21, at 905, 940-41.
217. See supra note 156.
218. Frederick M. Morgan, Jr. and Jennifer M. Verkamp, Notes from the Field: Practicalities of the Qui Tam “Working Partnership” Under the 1986 False Claims Act Amendments, 29 TAF Q. REV. 29, 33 (“There is a perception afield that there are too many overzealous, ‘under-helpful,’ financially-driven relators with weak or non-existent cases, the
investigation of which depletes, rather than augments, federal resources.”); see, e.g., False
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manage this so that the FCA remains more of a strength than a
weakness to R is to ensure that R has flexibility to conduct a minimal
review of P’s information when R deems such review appropriate.219
R will incur the costs it incurred in Game One when R opted not
to investigate allegations of T’s wrongdoing but had no inside information about T’s wrongdoing from P: (1) R’s decision will empower T
to the extent T is aware of R’s decision; (2) R’s decision will empower
other businesses to the extent they are aware of R’s decision; (3) R’s
decision will allow T time to refine its malfeasance strategies; (4) R’s
decision will allow more victims to be hurt. There are two additional
costs to R in Game Two from Game One because of P’s participation:
(5) Because of our assumption that T is engaged in wrongdoing, it is
safe to assume that multiple Ps within T know at least something
about T’s wrongdoing. Unlike Game One where there is no P, R’s disregard of P’s information in Game Two signals to all future Ps, inside
or outside of T, that R is not responsive, supportive or interested in
whistleblowers.220 This signaling almost certainly will discourage
other Ps from coming forth; and (6) If T knows that P has provided R
with information, R’s passivity in the face of such information may
encourage T and other aware businesses to retaliate against Ps
within their ranks.
For these reasons, R’s costs outweigh R’s benefits in Game Two
when R opts to do only a minimal investigation of T upon learning of
T’s possible wrongdoing.221 Also, because of P’s participation in Game
Two and the additional signaling R’s strategy now conveys, R’s costs
of conducting only a minimal investigation of T increase in Game
Two from Game One when P was not a player.
At Node II in Game Two where R opts to actively investigate T, R
reaps the following benefits: (1) Deterrence of T’s wrongdoing; (2) Deterrence of other observant businesses in their wrongdoing or
planned wrongdoing; and (3) Development of institutional knowledge. These benefits are amplified in Game Two from Game One. The
first benefit, deterring T’s wrongdoing, will be enhanced in Game
Two if T is aware that R is working with P because T will know that

Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1990)
(statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Attorney General, Dep’t. of Justice), 30-32 (statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector General, Dep’t Health & Human Services), 68-71
(statement of John R. Phillips, Hall & Phillips).
219. Granted, such an approach is contrary to the capture theory that supports giving
those outside R the ability to monitor R for decisions motivated by laziness or corruption,
rather than merit. Until there is greater reason to believe the DOJ is captured by such influences, saving R’s resources weighs in favor of recognizing the merit of R exercising such
discretion.
220. See generally supra note 151.
221. See infra app. A chart 18, at 685.
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when P, an informed insider, is working with R, R’s case against T
will be stronger. The value of this deterrence will not be enhanced
greatly however because it is not likely, at the investigation stage,
that T will know that P is working with R. Neither R nor P will want
to disclose P’s involvement to T, or to anyone. R will want to keep P’s
identity as a whistleblower secret so that P can continue to gather information that assists R’s investigation.222 P will want to maintain
secrecy because of the retaliation and ostracization P is likely to face
if others know of P’s assistance to R. The third benefit, developing institutional knowledge within R about T’s wrongdoing and that of
other actors in T’s industry, is considerably enhanced in Game Two
because of P’s information about T’s behavior and about T’s industry.
Also, in Game Two, where P is a player, there is a new benefit for
R when R chooses to actively investigate T. By working with P, R
signals to future Ps that R responds and supports Ps, thereby encouraging future Ps to come forward.223
R’s cost in opening and actively investigating T in Game Two is
the same type of cost R experienced in Game One (investigative
costs, the allocation of which prevent R from investigating other Ts),
but it hurts R less. This cost decreases from Game One because of P’s
assistance in Game Two, at least in the twenty-seven percent of the
cases where P is helpful.224 In these cases, P will be able to explain to
R what wrongdoing is taking place within T; interpret and explain
T’s policies and procedures; identify who within T is involved in the
wrongdoing and who is likely to serve as credible, knowledgeable
witnesses; describe what documents, records and correspondence exist to corroborate R’s case and where those documents may be stored;
and alert regulators as to where T’s assets are held or are being funneled.225 Because of P’s assistance, R’s investigation will be more efficient and focused than it was in Game One and R’s overall investigative costs will be less.226 For this same reason, R’s opportunity cost of
not pursuing other defendants because of the resources R allocated to
pursue T is reduced. Since R’s case against T will be stronger in
Game Two with P’s help, the likelihood of foregoing better investiga222. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp.
2d 420, 442, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
223. Cf. POSNER, supra note 151, at 149.
224. See supra note 156.
225. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
226. Inside information is crucial to successful investigation and proof of complex economic wrongdoing. Knowledgeable insiders can produce information about inchoate or ongoing malfeasance of which law enforcement is unaware. Such insiders can also save
enormous amounts of law enforcement resources by focusing governmental investigations
and case preparation. Cutting down on unproductive investigations not only helps law enforcement, but also aids defendants and putative defendants who are spared financial and
reputational costs in responding to misguided investigations. Bucy, Information as a
Commodity, supra note 21, at 940-47.
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tions decreases. With P’s help, R will be proceeding in a strong case
against T.
For these reasons, R’s benefits outweigh R’s costs when R opts to
actively investigate T in Game Two upon learning from P of T’s possible wrongdoing.227
2. Nodes III and IV: Whether R Intervenes in P’s Lawsuit Against T
The FCA permits R to intervene at the inception of P’s case and
continue as the primary plaintiff throughout the duration of the case
or, alternatively, to intervene fully or for limited purposes at any
stage of the case.228 R can, for example, intervene solely to seek dismissal of P’s case or to litigate an issue on appeal.
At Node III, R opts not to intervene in P’s action. R realizes the
following benefits with this strategy: (1) R saves resources. By declining to intervene, R recognizes a significant benefit even in light of
our assumption that T is engaged in wrongdoing if R makes this decision in the appropriate cases—those in which P’s information is not
helpful. Conversely, if R chooses not to intervene in those cases in
which P’s information is helpful, this benefit is minimal. For purposes of assessing this benefit we will assume that in the majority of
cases that R makes an appropriate decision and declines to intervene
when P’s information is not helpful; and (2) Even if R makes an inappropriate decision and decides against intervention in a meritorious case, R can still realize a benefit. Under the FCA, if R does not
intervene in a case brought by a P, R still collects a hefty percentage
(seventy to seventy-five percent) of the judgment if P successfully
pursues the case.229 Although historically it is unusual for relators in
non-intervened cases to prevail, it is possible.230
R will incur the following possible costs by declining to intervene.231 These are possible costs because R incurs them only if R has
227. See infra app. A chart 19, at 686.
228. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2002); See, e.g., United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans
Parish Sch. Bd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 546 (E.D. La. 1999) (allowing government to intervene for
purposes of appeal after declining intervention in the case); Juliano v. Fed. Asset Disposition Assoc., 736 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1990) (allowing government to intervene
solely to move for dismissal of the case).
229. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
230. The total amount paid to relators, from October 1, 1986 through September 30,
2000, as their statutory share when the government has intervened is $576 million. The
total amount paid to relators over this same time period when the government has not intervened is $35.3 million. Only 2.1% (12 out of 570) of qui tam cases in which the government has intervened have been dismissed; 71.1% (1357 out of 1907) of qui tam cases in
which the government has not intervened have been dismissed. Letter from the U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Author, FOIA Request 145-FOI-6072 (Oct. 20, 2001) (on file with author). Of
the 3202 qui tam cases filed since 1987, the government has intervened or otherwise pursued 17.8% (570 out of 3202). Id.
231. WEST, supra note 31, at 46.
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incorrectly assessed the merits of P’s case and failed to intervene
when it should have: (1) R’s decision will cause P’s case to fail. Few
Ps have adequate litigative and investigative resources to fully and
successfully pursue a case alone. Sometimes, courts assume that P’s
case is not meritorious if R does not intervene. Thus in most situations, R’s non-intervention decision will doom P’s case to dismissal,
or to less success than might otherwise be possible. This is a cost only
when P’s case is meritorious. Otherwise, it is a benefit.
Secondly, by not intervening, even for limited purposes,232 R loses
the opportunity to guide and direct P’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Allowing Ps to pursue inappropriate cases or urge irresponsible interpretations of the FCA has significant collateral costs, such
as creating unnecessary expense and damage for defendants, generating hostility toward the FCA among policy makers, and creating
precedent that binds R and responsible Ps in all FCA cases.233 R’s
careful monitoring of Ps’ qui tam actions is also important for constitutional reasons. The FCA is vulnerable under the “Appointments”234
and “take-care”235 clauses if R does not maintain adequate supervision over Ps.236
Thirdly, by declining to intervene, R may empower T and other
observant businesses to continue their wrongdoing if T and other
businesses are aware that P has presented information of T’s wrongdoing to R and that R has declined to intervene. There are two ways
T and other businesses could learn of R’s non-intervention decision.
The first is through R’s investigation of T. If R investigates T before
making its non-intervention decision by serving subpoenas, interviewing T’s personnel, or engaging in discussion with T’s counsel, T
will obviously learn of R’s investigation. When R does not sue T, or
when P continues with P’s suit against T alone, after R has declined
to join the case, T will know that R did not believe the suit was meritorious.
Fourthly, by not intervening and by abdicating inappropriate
prosecutorial discretion to Ps, R may be losing an opportunity to
232. The FCA allows R to intervene for limited purposes such as to move for dismissal
of a non-meritorious case, or to urge a particular interpretation of the FCA on appeal. 31
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
233. Bucy, supra note 20, at 62-68.
234. The “Appointment” clause provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, . . . but the
Congress may by Law vest the appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
235. The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3.
236. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939, 950-58 (2002).
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shape society’s norms. R is able to send powerful signals to economic
actors through its regulatory agenda—what conduct is wrong, why it
is wrong, and what substitute conduct is permissible.237 To the extent
that R allows Ps, who are motivated by the prospect of a large recovery rather than by public interest, to initiate and pursue cases of
questionable merit, R allows muddled signals to be sent to economic
actors. This confused message may lead actors to adopt nonproductive strategies that damage their competitiveness and hurt the national economy.
For these reasons, R’s costs at Node III outweigh R’s benefits
when R opts not to intervene in P’s lawsuit against T.238
At Node IV, where R intervenes in P’s action against T, R achieves
the same types of benefits R realized in Game One where R brought
an action against T alone: (1) Enhanced credibility for R among T
and observant businesses; (2) Enhanced credibility for R among potential witnesses against T; (3) Enhanced morale within R; (4) Minimizing, if not preventing, harm to victims; (5) Deterring T’s wrongdoing; and (6) Deterring wrongdoing by other observant businesses.
These benefits are amplified in Game Two since with P’s information
it is more likely, at least in twenty-seven percent of the cases,239 that
R will discover the full extent of T’s wrongdoing and that R will ultimately prevail in the action. There is also a new benefit in Game
Two: (7) By working with P, R sends a powerful signal of support and
encouragement to future whistleblowers.
In Game Two, R incurs the same types of costs it incurred in
Game One where R brought an action against T without P’s involvement: (1) Investigative expenses; and (2) Opportunity cost—by pursuing T, R is unable to pursue other targets. Both of these costs decrease in Game Two from Game One. P’s information makes R’s investigation more focused and efficient, thus reducing the resources R
must devote to pursue T. When P’s counsel is experienced, assistance
to R by P’s counsel further reduces the amount of resources R must
devote to T’s case. Both phenomena will allow R to put more of its resources into other investigations, thereby reducing R’s opportunity
cost.
For these reasons, R’s benefits outweigh R’s costs in Game Two
when R opts to intervene in P’s suit against T.240

237.
238.
239.
240.

See supra notes 169, 174.
See infra app. A chart 20, at 686.
See supra note 156.
See infra app. A chart 21, at 687.
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3. Nodes V and VI: R Wins or Loses the Action It Brought with P
Against T
At Node V, when R, working with P, prevails in the action it
brought against T, R achieves the same types of benefits it obtained
with its victory in Game One: (1) Public acknowledgment that T’s
behavior is wrong; (2) Education of relevant industry as to permissible and impermissible behavior; (3) Enhanced credibility for R; (4)
Payment by T of judgment, fines, and penalties; (5) Deterrence of T’s
wrongdoing; and (6) Deterrence of wrongdoing by other observant
businesses. These benefits are amplified in Game Two from Game
One. With P’s information, it is likely in Game Two that R will resolve the case against T more thoroughly and more advantageously
to R than R could have done without P’s information and assistance,
at least in the twenty-seven percent of cases where P’s information is
helpful.241 Also, as noted supra, there is an additional benefit to R in
winning the action in Game Two: (7) R’s success in the action will
signal encouragement to future whistleblowers.
Although R prevails in the action it brought with P against T, R
will incur costs with its victory: (1) The opportunity cost of foregoing
actions against other Ts. As noted, because R’s resources are limited
and R does not have adequate resources to pursue all deserving Ts,
pursuit of one T necessarily means R cannot pursue other Ts. (2) Depending on T’s assets and the judgment ordered or settlement
reached, R may not be able to recoup all of its investigative and litigative expenses from T as part of the settlement of the case.
Both of these costs decrease for R in Game Two from Game One
where R did not work with P. R’s investigative and litigative costs
will not be as great in Game Two because P’s information makes R’s
case against T more focused and efficient, and because assistance
from P’s counsel supplements R’s resources. This will free up more of
R’s resources to pursue other Ts, thus reducing R’s opportunity cost.
Additionally, reduced investigative and litigative costs make it less
serious for R if R is unable to recoup all of its costs from T after R
prevails.
For these reasons, R’s benefits at Node V are significantly greater
than its costs when R wins the action it brought, with P, against T.242
At Node VI, in Game Two when R, working with P, loses the action it brought against T, R still achieves two benefits: (1) An end to
R’s investigative and litigative cost; and (2) Possibly, some deterrence
of T and other observant businesses if these actors view the costs of
responding to R’s investigation and action as so significant that they

241. See supra note 156.
242. See infra app. A chart 22, at 687.
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opt to operate their businesses more honestly in the future so as to
avoid R’s scrutiny.
R incurs the same types of costs in Game Two as it incurred in
Game One: (1) Lost credibility; (2) Lost tangible and intangible expenses incurred in pursuing the action against T; (3) Opportunity
cost of not pursuing other deserving T’s by allocating resources to
pursuing T; and (4) Signaling to T and other observant businesses
that they can continue their wrongdoing with impunity. The first
cost, lost credibility, is amplified in Game Two from Game One. In
Game Two, R loses more credibility than in Game One because R
has, by its failure, not only lost a specific case but has demonstrated,
for all to see, the failure of a regulatory scheme that strives to partner private parties with regulators in pursuit of wrongdoers.
As noted throughout Game Two, R incurs an additional cost because of the enhanced signaling to other players that occurs in Game
Two. Since Game Two is played with the participation of P, R’s loss
in the action signals to future Ps that it may not be worth their while
to bring information about T’s wrongdoing to R, or to work with R to
investigate or litigate against T. No Ps want to endure the hardship
they will by becoming whistleblowers only to lose the actions they
pursue with R.
For these reasons R’s costs outweigh R’s benefits when R and P
lose the action they have brought against T.243
E. Game 2(B): Regulatory Game with the FCA: From T’s Perspective
Game 2(B) looks at Game Two from T’s perspective. The triggering event is T’s commission of wrongdoing. From this event, T faces
the decision of whether to disclose its wrongdoing (Nodes I, II),
whether to cooperate with R when R opens an investigation of T
(Nodes III, IV), or whether to cooperate with R (Nodes V, VI) or with
P (Nodes VII, VIII). At Nodes IX and X, T either wins or loses the action brought against it.244
1. Nodes I and II: Whether T Discloses Its Wrongdoing to R
At Node I where T decides not to disclose its wrongdoing to R, T’s
benefits in Game Two are the same T realized in Game One: T possibly avoids (1) any finding of culpability, (2) imposition of sanctions,
and (3) collateral consequences that may flow from culpability and
sanctions. T’s costs in adopting a non-disclosure strategy are: (1) Uncertainty in not knowing whether R will investigate T in the future,
and resulting difficulty planning; (2) Lost opportunity to influence
243. See infra app. A chart 23, at 688.
244. See infra app. B, at 702 (diagramming Game 2(B)).
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R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) Lost opportunity to influence the
sanctions R will seek against T; (4) Lost opportunity to influence the
collateral consequences, such as publicity, that will flow from R’s assessment of T’s culpability and the imposition of sanctions on T; and
(5) Lost opportunity to minimize and manage the costs T will incur
when responding to R if R learns of T’s wrongdoing. These are the
same types of costs T incurred in Game One. In Game Two they simply hurt T more. As noted in Game One, the value of T’s costs in
adopting a non-disclosure policy depend upon the likelihood of T getting caught in the future. This is where the presence of P as a player
makes a difference in Game Two. When P, an insider who has
knowledge of T’s wrongdoing, is willing to give information to R and
to work with R in pursuing T, the chances of T getting caught increase significantly, at least in those cases where P’s information is
helpful. Thus, the costs to T of adopting a non-disclosure strategy increase in Game Two from Game One.245
At Node II, where T decides to disclose its wrongdoing to R, T experiences the converse of its costs and benefits at Node I.246
2. Nodes III and IV: Whether T Cooperates in R’s Investigation
Once R opens an investigation of T, T must decide whether to cooperate with R. As in Game One, T obtains the following benefits by
deciding not to cooperate with R’s investigation: (1) T avoids a finding of culpability; (2) T avoids sanctions; and (3) T avoids collateral
consequences of sanctions R may seek. Because of the presence in
Game Two of P, these benefits decrease in value for T in Game Two
since as noted, their value depends upon whether R learns about T’s
wrongdoing. The benefits of non-disclosure are not worth much if R
discovers T’s wrongdoing, and the chances of R discovering T’s
wrongdoing increase in Game Two with P’s information about T’s
wrongdoing. Thus in Game Two, T’s benefits of non-disclosure become more speculative and less valuable.
T incurs the same types of costs in Game Two as T sustained in
Game One when it adopted a non-cooperation policy: (1) Uncertainty
in not knowing whether R will initiate an action against T; (2) Lost
opportunity to affect R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) Lost opportunity to affect the severity of sanctions that may be imposed on T;
(4) Lost opportunity to affect collateral consequences flowing from
the sanctions that may be imposed on T; and (5) Lost opportunity to
minimize and manage the resources T expends in responding to R’s
investigation. With one exception, all of these costs are greater for T
in Game Two. The one exception is the cost of not knowing what R
245. See infra app. A chart 24, at 688.
246. See infra app. A chart 25, at 689.
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may do. This uncertainty decreases in Game Two, since with P as a
player, it becomes more certain that R will initiate an action against
T. The remaining four costs all increase, however, for the same reason. The more likely it is that R will initiate an action against T, the
greater the opportunities lost for T in adopting a non-cooperation policy.
For these reasons, T’s costs of adopting a non-cooperation strategy
in Game Two outweigh the benefits of choosing such a strategy.247
The converse is true at Node IV of Game Two where T decides to
cooperate with R. P’s participation in Game Two, which makes it
more likely that R’s investigation will be focused, efficient and will
result in successful action against T, increases the benefits T obtains
by cooperating with R. One of T’s costs of cooperating, expenditure of
resources, decreases in Game Two because of P’s participation. The
resources T spends in responding to R’s investigation are likely to be
less in Game Two, since with P’s guidance, R’s investigation will be
more focused and efficient. The other cost T incurs because it adopts
a cooperation strategy, cutting back on its wrongdoing, remains the
same in Game Two as in Game One; P’s presence should not affect
this.
For these reasons, the benefits to T of cooperating with R when R
opens an investigation of T outweigh T’s costs in doing so.248
3. Nodes V and VI: Whether T Adopts a Strategy of Cooperation
with R After R Has Intervened in P’s Suit
After R’s investigation, T faces slightly different steps in Game
Two than in Game One. This is because P and R face different
choices in Game Two and their decisions affect T. Because of the
structure of the FCA, R doesn’t get to decide whether it will initiate
an action against T after it has investigated T. In Game Two, P has
already seized the initiative and R is left to decide whether it will intervene in the action P has already filed. Granted, R can file an
amended complaint if it chooses to intervene in the action brought by
P, but the point is that P, not R, has seized the initiative in choosing
to pursue T. If R does not intervene in P’s lawsuit, P has the option of
continuing the lawsuit on her own. Thus, T’s decision whether to cooperate after an action has been filed against it, is two-fold. T must
decide whether it will cooperate with R if R intervenes in P’s alreadyfiled action. If R declines to intervene in P’s lawsuit but P continues
it alone, T must decide whether to cooperate with P.

247. See infra app. A chart 26, at 689.
248. See infra app. A chart 27, at 690.
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Adoption by T of a non-cooperation strategy with R after R has intervened in P’s case presents T with the following benefits: (1) R, now
working with P, will have to prove its case against T without T’s
help. If R and P are unable to do so, T’s non-cooperation strategy succeeded. (2) It is possible that even with P’s help, R’s action will fail to
identify all of T’s wrongdoing. By continuing a non-cooperation policy, T maximizes this chance. This benefit is tempered by the fact
that if R wins the action against T, regulators will gain enough access to T’s internal records that R almost certainly will discover the
rest of T’s wrongdoing and T will suffer even greater consequences
for not fully disclosing its activity to R (and possibly for concealing it,
depending on T’s testimony at trial or comments during settlement
conferences).249 (3) When R intervenes in P’s action, T obtains the
benefit of knowledge—about R’s focus, devotion of resources, and
strength of case. The presence of P in Game Two enhances T’s prospects for obtaining information about the case against it. Under the
FCA practice, T may be able to gain, through discovery, the “evidence
and information” P supplied to R when P initially filed P’s lawsuit.
Potentially this could provide T with considerable information about
R’s case against it. In addition, if P and R have disagreements over
strategy and those disagreements are resolved by a court after hearings, T may gain further access to information about the case against
it through R and P’s squabbles.
The costs T incurs in Game Two by adopting a non-cooperation
strategy are: (1) Uncertainty in how R’s action will be resolved; (2)
Lost opportunity to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3)
Lost opportunity to influence R’s choice of sanctions; (4) Lost opportunity to influence the collateral consequences that flow from the
sanctions; and (5) Lost opportunity to minimize or manage the resources T expends in responding to R’s action. As noted supra, these
opportunity costs increase from Game One where P was not a player
because P’s participation in Game Two increases R’s chances of success in the action. This, in turn, increases the value of the opportunities lost when T chooses not to cooperate. In Game Two, R faces another cost. Now that R has filed an action and it becomes more likely
that a court (administrative or judicial) will become involved and the
court may be more inclined to impose harsh sanctions on T if R prevails in the action. The court may view T’s non-cooperation as waste-

249. Ronald A. Sarachan & Charles A. DeMonaco, U.S. Department of Justice: Factors
in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Disclosure Efforts by the Violators, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2000
739, 748-50 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Corse Handbook Series No. B-1177, 2000), available at WL 1177 PLI/Corp 739.
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ful of R’s and the court’s time and resources. For these reasons, T’s
costs exceed T’s benefits at Node V.250
At Node VI, where T opts to cooperate with R after R has filed an
action against T, T’s benefits and costs are the converse of those just
noted, yielding a net benefit to T of opting to cooperate with R.251
4. Nodes VII and VIII: Whether T Cooperates with P if P
Continues with the Case Alone After R Declines to Intervene
If P continues its case against T after R declines to intervene, T
must once again decide if it will cooperate, this time with P. The
benefits to T of adopting a non-cooperation strategy remain, as before, as the opportunity to avoid: (1) liability, (2) sanctions, and (3)
collateral consequences flowing from the sanctions. The value of
these benefits increases considerably for T when the sole plaintiff is
P. Historically, once the DOJ has declined to intervene in an FCA
suit brought by a P, the suit has little chance of success. This could
be for a variety of reasons: the suit was not meritorious to begin with
(which is why the DOJ declined to intervene); the suit is meritorious,
but P is unable to fully investigate or litigate it without R’s help; or
the suit is meritorious, but courts assume that it is not if the DOJ
declines to intervene.252 Whatever the reason, because declined FCA
actions have had little chance of success, T’s strategy of noncooperation almost certainly will be more beneficial to T than if R
had intervened.
The costs to T of not cooperating with P are the same types of
costs any defendant experiences when sued, whether by a private
party (P) or regulatory authority (R): (1) Uncertainty of not knowing
if P will prevail; (2) Lost opportunity to affect P’s assessment of liability; (3) Lost opportunity to affect P’s request for sanctions; (4)
Lost opportunity to affect the collateral consequences that flow from
the judgment P may obtain; and (5) Lost opportunity to minimize or
manage the resources T expends in responding to P’s suit. Given P’s
unlikely chance of success in P’s suit against T, however, these costs
are worth considerably less than when R is bringing an action
against T.
For the reasons noted, T’s benefits outweigh T’s costs if T adopts a
non-cooperation strategy with P when P decides to pursue the action
against T alone after R has declined to intervene.253
T’s benefits and costs at Node VIII when T adopts a cooperation
strategy with P are the converse of those at Node VII, where T
250.
251.
252.
253.

See infra app. A chart 28, at 690.
See infra app. A chart 29, at 691.
WEST, supra note 31, at 46.
See infra app. A chart 30, at 691.
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adopted a non-cooperation strategy with P. Given the historically
poor chance P has of succeeding against T, the costs to T of adopting
a cooperation strategy with P outweigh T’s benefits in doing so.254
5. Nodes IX and X: Whether T Loses or Wins the Action Brought
Against It
T achieves the same benefits in Game Two when it loses the action brought against it as T obtained in Game One: (1) An end to the
tangible and intangible expenses T was incurring to litigate; (2) An
end to the uncertainty created for T by the ongoing litigation; and (3)
Possible restructuring within T that could make T a more effective
business entity.
T incurs the same costs with its loss in Game Two as it did in
Game One: (1) Lingering effects of the investigation and action that
are detrimental to T; and (2) Fines, damages, penalties, and mandated internal restructuring. There are, however, two additional
costs that T will incur in Game Two. Both result from the presence of
P as a player: The first is the encouragement to future Ps that R’s
success against T will convey. The second additional cost is more
global. T’s loss of an enforcement action brought by an industry insider with R may generate greater intolerance of corporate financial
aggression than would a victory brought only by R. The ability of
regulatory actions to impact our norms of acceptable corporate behavior may increase if respected, or at least knowledgeable insiders
are part of the enforcement team. Such intolerance may manifest in
more shareholder derivative lawsuits, less job security for CEOs,
more scrutiny by Boards of Directors, and less flexibility for corporate leaders to pursue risky business opportunities. For these obvious reasons, T’s costs outweigh T’s benefits when T loses the action
brought against it.255
At Node X where T prevails in the suit brought against it by R
and P, or just by P, T achieves the converse benefits and costs T experienced when losing the case with the addition of one additional
benefit and one additional cost. The additional benefit is that publicity of T’s success and P’s resulting failure may well discourage future
Ps from coming forward, especially if publicity about the case reveals
hardships P almost certainly encountered when bringing the action.
The additional cost T incurs in Game Two results from this same
publicity. Although coverage of T’s win (and P’s participation and
loss) will probably discourage some future Ps from coming forward, it
will also inform others about the existence of such actions. For these

254. See infra app. A chart 31, at 692.
255. See infra app. A chart 32, at 692.
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obvious reasons, T’s benefits outweight T’s costs when T wins the action brought against it.256
F. Game 2(C): Regulatory Game with the FCA: From P’s Perspective
Game 2(C) views Game Two from P’s perspective. As in Game
One, the triggering event is P’s knowledge of T’s wrongdoing.
Whereas P had only three options for conduct in Game One, P has
these three options plus many more in Game Two. As in Game One,
P has the option of doing nothing (Node I), reporting the wrongdoing
internally (Node II), and reporting the wrongdoing externally (Node
III). The reporting externally option changes slightly in Game Two
because P reports externally not by going to the press or to multiple
regulatory bodies but by filing a qui tam lawsuit (under seal) and
providing a written report of all “information and evidence” P possesses to the United States Department of Justice.257 If P chose this
last option, P must next decide whether to work actively with R as R
investigates the matter (Nodes IV and V), whether to continue in the
case with R if R intervenes (Node VI), whether to pursue the case
alone if R does not intervene (Node VII), and whether to dismiss the
action if R does not intervene (Node VIII). The benefits and costs to P
of winning or losing the action are assessed at Nodes IX and X.258
1. Node I: P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T’s Wrongdoing
P’s strategy at Node I of doing nothing upon learning of T’s
wrongdoing presents the same benefits and costs for P in Game Two
as in Game One. P reaps the following benefits: (1) P will not precipitate retaliation by T; (2) P will not incur T-imposed personal or professional hardships because of P’s whistleblowing.259 P incurs the following costs: (1) T’s wrongdoing may undermine P’s professional security; (2) P ultimately may be held culpable for T’s wrongdoing; (3) P
may experience personal angst for not reporting T’s wrongdoing.
P will experience one additional cost and two enhanced costs in
Game Two. The enhanced costs are a greater likelihood that T’s
wrongdoing will undermine P’s professional security, and a greater
likelihood that P will be held personally culpable for T’s wrongdoing.
The fact that all knowledgeable Ps are encouraged to come forward
and alert the government to T’s malfeasance enhances these two
costs if P adopts a do-nothing strategy. Because all Ps have incentive
to report T’s wrongdoing to R in Game Two, it is more likely that R
256. See infra app. A chart 33, at 693.
257. In fact, under the FCA, relators cannot disclose the information they have included in their qui tam lawsuit until the seal has been lifted. WEST, supra note 31, at 17.
258. See infra app. B, at 703 (diagramming Game 2(C)).
259. See supra notes 204-05.
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will learn of T’s wrongdoing and act upon it. Once exposed, T’s existence, or at least T’s profitability, may be threatened. This could
jeopardize P’s professional security if P is a T employee. In addition,
once other Ps report T’s wrongdoing, Ps who may have been involved
in the wrongdoing, even tangentially, have lost the opportunity to
demonstrate their good faith, remorse, or minimal culpability by
alerting regulators to it. With broad theories of liability such as conspiracy and complicity, there could be a serious problem for P since
such theories ensnare those tangentially involved in wrongdoing.260
The significance of these costs depends upon the likelihood that multiple Ps are aware of T’s wrongdoing.
The additional cost for P in Game Two when P adopts a donothing strategy is a lost opportunity. The FCA gives successful Ps a
share of any judgment recovered as a result of P’s efforts.261 Thus, Ps
who decide to do nothing, or Ps who report only internally, lose the
opportunity to share in any judgment recovered. Moreover, because
the FCA gives only the first-reporting P the opportunity to become a
qui tam relator and share in the judgment,262 Ps who ultimately report T’s wrongdoing after initially opting to do nothing risk preemption by other Ps.
For these reasons, P’s benefits of adopting a do-nothing strategy
remain the same in Games One and Two, but P’s costs increase in
Game Two.263
2. Node II: P Reports Internally
P’s strategy of reporting internally has the same benefits in Game
Two as in Game One: (1) Possible prevention of future problems for
T; (2) P is viewed as demonstrating leadership and advances within
T; (3) P minimizes or prevents P’s personal angst for failing to report;
(4) In Game Two, P obtains an additional benefit. Because the FCA
provides statutory protection for Ps against retaliation by employers
and because internal reporting activates this protection in most

260. Conspiracy punishes the act of agreeing to commit a crime and everyone who
agreed is guilty. Conspiracy liability includes actors who only agreed that another coconspirator would commit the crime and did nothing beyond the act of agreement to further the crime intended. BUCY, supra note 166, at 5-6. Pinkerton liability goes even further,
making a co-conspirator liable for all substantive crimes committed by another coconspirator if such crimes were in furtherance of the conspiracy and were reasonably foreseeable as part of the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946).
Complicity liability makes a person guilty for having the intent that another person commit a crime and rendering aid or assistance to that person. Such assistance can be as
minimal as encouraging the other person. United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d
986, 999 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 1992)).
261. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
262. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2002).
263. See infra app. A chart 34, at 693.
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situations,264 P can obtain this protection in Game Two by reporting
T’s wrongdoing internally (assuming P is an employee of T).
By reporting internally in Game Two, P incurs the same costs P
experienced in Game One: (1) Possible retaliation by T or others
within the relevant industry; (2) Expenditure of P’s time and energy;
and (3) Personal and/or professional hardships resulting from internal reporting. (4) In Game Two, P incurs an additional cost, however.
Because the FCA rewards only Ps who come forward by using the
FCA’s procedure (file a qui tam suit under seal, provide information
to the Department of Justice) and because only the first P to file such
a suit may proceed, the FCA, in effect, disadvantages Ps who report
internally. The FCA only rewards Ps who report externally and only
those who do so using FCA procedure. Thus, by reporting internally,
Ps lose the opportunity to reap the benefits of using the FCA model.
This is a somewhat speculative cost since it is not clear how many Ps
know of T’s wrongdoing and, of those, how many are willing to expose
themselves to the personal and professional costs of reporting
wrongdoing.
For these reasons, P’s benefits and costs increase in Game Two
when P opts to report internally.265
3. Node III: P Reports Externally
P’s strategy of reporting T’s wrongdoing externally presents the
same benefits in Game Two as in Game One: (1) Possible prevention
of future problems for T; (2) P is viewed as demonstrating leadership
and advances within T; (3) Minimizes or prevents P’s personal angst
for failure to report; (4) Allows P to show P’s nonculpability, or at
least, to negotiate favorably with regulators regarding P’s culpability;
(5) Obtains some protection against T’s retaliation of P; and (6) Moti-

264. The FCA provides that:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or
in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done . . . in furtherance
of an action under this section . . . shall be entitled to all relief necessary to
make the employee whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with the
same seniority status . . . 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back
pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). It is not necessary that an individual file a lawsuit under the FCA to
receive this protection. See, e.g., Dookeran v. Mercy Hosp., 281 F.3d 105, 108 (3rd Cir.
2002); United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Neal v. Honeywell, 33 F.3d 860, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1994). All that is necessary (at least in
some circuits) is that an employee make intra-corporate complaints of fraud. Neal, 33 F.3d
at 864; see also Hopkins v. Actions, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 706, 708-09 (S.D. Tex. 1997). But see
Smith v. Mitre Corp., 949 F. Supp. 943 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that purely intracorporate complaints do not constitute acts in furtherance of an FCA suit).
265. See infra app. A chart 35, at 694.
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vates T to remedy the situation. Of these, the fourth benefit will be
amplified in Game Two since the FCA supplies protection against retaliation by employers against employees for whistleblowing actions
that fall within the FCA. While P probably qualifies for this protection by reporting internally (at Node II), P clearly qualifies for this
protection by reporting T’s wrongdoing externally.266
There are three additional benefits to P of reporting externally in
Game Two than were available in Game One. The first is that the
FCA provides P not with just another external reporting source, but
with a particularly effective external source. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is especially effective for several reasons.
The FCA has a practice, within the DOJ, for receiving, evaluating,
and working with Ps.267 Being able to contact a federal agency that is
experienced in receiving and processing P’s information makes it less
likely that a whistleblower’s information will get lost in a maze of
bureaucracy. Also, the DOJ has resources to improve upon and supplement P’s information—experienced and trained attorneys and investigators and helpful discovery tools (like Certificates of Demand)268 that are not available outside of the DOJ.269 These resources
can build upon P’s information. Lastly, the DOJ has considerable
power vis á vis Ts. The DOJ can levy sanctions on Ts such as administrative penalties, initiate actions such as civil suits for penalties
and damages, and seek criminal charges. Because of this power, the
DOJ can be quite productive in extracting concessions and settlements from T. For all of these reasons, the DOJ is a formidable ally
for P.270
The second benefit P obtains in Game Two that was not available
to P in Game One arises from the fact that in Game Two, P almost
certainly will need counsel who is experienced in FCA cases. This can
be beneficial when counsel is able to alert P to what lies ahead and to
provide guidance that helps P cope with difficulties P will face as a
whistleblower. Counsel can also direct P to a wealth of sources that
provide financial, social, and emotional support for Ps.271 P is more
266. The FCA protects “[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions
of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done . . . in furtherance of an
action under this section.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The FCA provides for an award of double
backpay damages plus attorneys fees and costs for such violations. Id.
267. Bucy, supra note 20, at 69, n.372; see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 45-79
(discussing United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323
(M.D. Fla. 2001), 114-40 (discussing United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
268. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2002).
269. See supra notes 80-101.
270. WEST, supra note 31, at 26; Kreindler, supra note 156, at 10.
271. There are growing numbers of groups that provide support for whistleblowers,
many started by former whistleblowers. Clyde H. Farnsworth, The Bureaucracy: Aid and
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likely to need counsel in Game Two than in Game One because reporting T’s wrongdoing to the DOJ under the FCA requires considerable sophistication. Failing to adequately follow FCA requirements
could lead to any variety of strategic missteps, such as disqualification of P under the FCA’s jurisdictional bar provision,272 R’s declination to intervene in P’s suit,273 or preemption by another P.274
The third and most significant benefit available to P in Game Two
that was not present in Game One is that P is entitled to share in a
percentage of any recovery obtained.
In Game Two, P’s strategy of reporting externally presents the
same types of costs P incurred in Game One: (1) Possible retaliation
by T and/or others within the relevant industry, resulting in personal
and professional hardship; (2) Expenditure of P’s time and energy;
and (3) P’s personal discomfort in becoming a public figure. The value
of these costs is likely to change, however. The first cost, retaliation
and resulting hardships, probably will increase in Game Two from
Game One simply because the stakes are higher for T if P reports using FCA protocol. The potential liability imposed by the FCA on Ts is
huge.275 These higher stakes lead to increased publicity, tension, and
although the FCA contains protection against it, increased chances of
retaliation against P.
In addition to enhanced costs in Game Two, P is likely to see an
additional cost. This is the cost of retaining counsel. As noted supra,
proceeding under the FCA necessitates retention of experienced
counsel. The out-of-pocket cost to P of retaining counsel will be
minimal since relators’ counsel tend to represent relators on contingency fee arrangements based upon a negotiated percentage of any
award the relator may receive,276 plus attorneys fees and costs
Comfort for Whistleblowers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1985, at A28 (reporting on the growing
support network for whistleblowers). For example, such support takes the form of legal
assistance, Farnsworth, supra, at A28, practical advice, see, e.g., Government Accountability Project, Survival Tips for Whistleblowers, at http://www.whistleblower.org/www/
tips.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003), and financial assistance, see, e.g., Taxpayers Against
Fraud (TAF), at http://www.taf.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2003). A staffer of one such public
interest group explained: “‘There’s a definite whistleblower’s community out there—and
it’s growing . . . . We know where to find each other . . . . We know where to go for help.
There’s a safety net.’” Farnsworth, supra, at A28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).
273. Bucy, supra note 20, at 51-52.
274. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5).
275. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
276. For example, in United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Electric
Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994), relator’s counsel and relator agreed that counsel would
receive twenty-five percent of the relator’s share. Id. at 1036. This percentage was in addition to attorneys’ fees and costs awarded by the court pursuant to the FCA. The total
amount awarded to relator’s counsel in this case was $4 million. Id. This amount was questioned as excessive by the court and the case was remanded for a determination of whether
the total fee was appropriate. Id. at 1045-49; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
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awarded by the court and paid by the defendant under the terms of
the FCA. Nevertheless, this is a possible cost necessitated in Game
Two.
For the above reasons, P’s benefits in reporting externally in
Game Two outweigh P’s costs.277
4. Nodes IV and V: Whether P Works Actively with R as R
Investigates T
P’s next options depend upon what R does in response to P’s reporting of T’s wrongdoing. If R actively investigates T, P must decide
to what extent it will work with R. The benefits to P of working
closely with R are: (1) P’s percentage of any judgment obtained will
increase, within the statutory range, proportional to P’s helpfulness
to R in pursuing the matter against T.278 (2) P’s counsel will urge P to
adopt a work-with-R-actively strategy. This is for two reasons. First,
P’s counsel wants the case to succeed and active assistance by P and
P’s counsel can facilitate success. As noted supra, historically, R’s intervention is crucial to the ultimate success of an FCA case. P’s active assistance, as well as P’s counsel’s active assistance to R during
R’s investigation of T, could encourage R to intervene in P’s case.
Since Ps’ counsel’s fee consists, at least in part, of a percentage of P’s
award, P’s counsel wants the case to be as successful as possible.
Second, when P’s counsel actively assists R, P’s counsel generates
greater attorneys fees which the FCA requires defendants to pay. For
these reasons, experienced counsel may be unwilling to represent P if
P does not commit to a work-with-R-actively strategy. Thus, P may
have to adopt such a strategy in order to retain experienced counsel.
(3) P has a greater chance of influencing the remedy in the case by
working actively with R. It may be important to P, for example, that
certain changes be made within T so that similar wrongdoing is less
likely to occur. Or, P may feel strongly that T should engage in community service as part of the judgment. (4) P may feel personal and
professional satisfaction in working with R to expose T’s wrongdoing,
to deter T and other observant businesses from engaging in such
wrongdoing, and to protect victims and possible future victims from
T’s wrongdoing and other similar wrongdoing.279
The costs to P of working actively with R are (1) expenditure of P’s
time and energy and (2) P’s emotional stress.280
277. See infra app. A chart 36, at 694.
278. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RELATOR’S SHARE GUIDELINES, reprinted in United
States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. 205 F.3d 97, 104-05 (3rd Cir. 2000).
The DOJ Guidelines are also available at the website of Taxpayers Against Fraud at
http://www.taf.org.
279. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 961-62.
280. See supra notes 207-08.
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For these reasons, the benefits to P significantly outweigh the
costs if P adopts a work-actively-with-R strategy.281 The benefits and
costs to P of not working actively with R are the converse of those
just noted. Thus, the costs significantly outweigh the benefits if P
chooses not to work actively with R once R begins to investigate T.282
5. Nodes VI, VII and VIII: Whether P Proceeds with the Case After
R Completes Its Investigation
After R investigates P’s allegations of T’s wrongdoing, R will decide whether to intervene in P’s lawsuit against T (under seal thus
far).283 If R intervenes, P is entitled to continue as a plaintiff with
R.284 Node VI addresses this option. The benefits of doing so are so
overwhelming that remaining as a plaintiff in the suit is almost a
non-decision for P: (1) Now that R has opted to intervene in P’s lawsuit, P (now joined by R) probably will win the case.285 (2) P will not
have to expend many tangible resources to litigate the case once R
intervenes. Either R will bear the brunt of the expense in pursuing
the case, or P’s counsel will be willing to do so since counsel works on
a contingency fee and will recognize the case’s chance of success
given R’s intervention.286 (3) Although P has been protected under the
FCA from retaliation by T since at least the point at which P filed
her qui tam action, R’s intervention further solidifies such protection.
Costs to P in continuing as a plaintiff once R has intervened would
most likely result from the publicity that follows R’s intervention.
Such publicity may highlight P’s role and cause greater ostracization
of P by P’s friends, professional colleagues, and future employers. Although the FCA protects P from professional retaliation by T for P’s
whistleblowing activity, the FCA cannot protect P from subtle discrimination by colleagues and friends, or from other business that
may shun P and make P’s employment in the industry problematic.287
One of these difficulties, finding future employment, can be alleviated considerably if P receives a generous recovery from the qui tam
suit.288 With such a financial cushion, P may gain the flexibility to
pursue a variety of professional options.

281. See infra app. A chart 37, at 695.
282. See infra app. A chart 38, at 695.
283. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2002).
284. Id.
285. Bucy, supra note 20, at 51.
286. Many FCA cases, in fact, settle as soon as R intervenes as a result of extended negotiation among R, T and P prior to R’s intervention. WEST, supra note 31, at 26. Thus,
most of the costs in pursuing an FCA case have been borne during the investigation.
287. See supra notes 207-08.
288. See supra notes 41-44.
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Thus, P’s benefits at Node VI in remaining in the case as coplaintiff once R intervenes are significant and P’s costs are minimal.289
If R declines to intervene in P’s action, P still has the option under
the FCA of pursuing the action alone. P opts for this strategy at Node
VII. The benefits to P of doing so are: (1) P still has a chance, albeit
slim,290 of winning the FCA action. (2) If P prevails in a case, P qualifies under the FCA for a higher statutory range (25-30 percent of
judgment) than if R had intervened (15-25 percent of judgment).
The costs to P of pursuing a qui tam action alone instead of dismissing it after R has declined to intervene are: (1) P’s chances of
prevailing in the lawsuit are poor.291 (2) P will incur significant tangible and intangible expenses in pursuing the case to conclusion.
These costs will include P’s time, emotional strain, and distraction
from work, family, and recreation.292 (3) P may lose experienced
counsel, who, aware of P’s minimal chance of success once R opts not
to intervene,293 declines to represent P once R has made a nonintervention decision. If P wishes to continue, P may have to do so
alone, or with less experienced counsel. Given the complexity of most
FCA cases, losing experienced counsel may further doom P’s chances
in the case. (4) P may become subject to greater risks of retaliation.
Although T incurs liability under the FCA if T retaliates against P,294
T may nevertheless feel empowered to do so once R has decided not
to intervene in the case, especially with subtle retaliation that may
escape FCA liability.
Thus, at Node VII the benefits to P of pursuing a qui tam action
after R has declined intervention are minimal while the costs are
significant.295 Conversely, at Node VIII, where P decides to dismiss
the action after R has declined to intervene, the benefits are significant while the costs are minimal.296
6. Node IX and X: Whether P (with or without R) Prevails in the
Action Brought
The benefits to P of winning the action P (alone or with R) has
brought are significant: (1) P will receive monetary recovery as a percentage of the judgment obtained against T. This recovery may be

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See infra app. A chart 39, at 696.
Bucy, supra note 20, at 51.
Id.
See supra notes 207-08.
Cf. WEST, supra note 31, at 46.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2002).
See infra app. A chart 40, at 696.
See infra app. A chart 41, at 697.
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quite large.297 (2) P may be publicly vindicated. (3) P will see an end
to what probably has been an emotionally draining and traumatic
experience.298
The costs for P of prevailing in the lawsuit are: (1) Possible emotional hardship in pursuing litigation that incriminates friends and
colleagues, or otherwise jeopardizes the livelihood of people P cares
about;299 and (2) Difficulty obtaining future employment within the
relevant business or industry.300
For these reasons, benefits to P of winning the action at Node IX
are significant while the costs are minimal.301
The benefit-cost analysis at Node X, if P loses the action it brings,
whether with or without R, is not the converse of P’s winning the action because the costs of losing are so significant. The ostracization P
may face from friends and colleagues and the difficulty P may have
finding employment, are likely to be considerably worse after losing
the action. Moreover, the psychological and physical stress of serving
as a whistleblower will be exacerbated by the loss since the verdict
likely will be seen as a statement that P’s allegations were unfounded. The only benefit to P in losing the action, an end to the
traumatic experience of serving as a qui tam relator, will be considerably offset by these costs. Thus, P’s costs in losing the action are
significantly greater than P’s benefits.302

IV. WHAT GAME THEORY TELLS US ABOUT THE MERITS OF
INCLUDING PRIVATE PARTIES IN THE REGULATORY GAME
It does not take Game Theory to see that introducing private parties into regulatory efforts affects such efforts in two obvious ways: a
new player is added to the regulatory game, and the strategies of existing players, the regulators, and targeted businesses become more
complicated. Game Theory enriches these observations, however, by
showing that integrating private parties into public regulatory efforts raises the stakes for all players and alters the Nash Equilibrium for all players.
A. Raising the Stakes
Playing the Games in this Article shows that all parties’ potential
gains and losses increase when private parties join the regulatory
game. Not surprisingly, of all of the players, private parties have the
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

See supra notes 41-44.
See supra notes 207-08.
See supra note 208.
See supra note 208.
See infra app. A chart 42, at 697.
See infra app. A chart 43, at 697.
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most to gain by joining the regulatory game. As Chart C4 shows,303 a
private party’s greatest possible gain in Game One where private
parties are not included as players is 40; in Game Two, where they
are included, the greatest possible gain soars to 325, an increase of
712%. Private parties’ potential costs when joining the regulatory
game increase even more, however. The greatest loss a private player
could sustain in Game One is 0; in Game Two it is -480,304 an increase of 480%. Regulators’ benefits and costs also change when private parties join the regulatory game. The greatest benefit regulators
could achieve in Game One is 250; in Game Two it is 480, an increase
of 92%. The greatest loss regulators could sustain in Game One is 180; in Game Two, it is -280,305 an increase of 55%. Targeted businesses are affected the least when private parties join the regulatory
game. The greatest benefit a targeted business could achieve in
Game One was 275; in Game Two, it is 345, an increase of 25%. The
greatest loss a targeted business could sustain in Game One is -370;
in Game Two it is -450,306 an increase of 21%.
What causes this shift in potential gains and losses when private
parties join regulators? There are different factors for different players. As Game Theory shows, the factors that impact the payoffs for
private parties are the opportunities to obtain a large financial recovery, secure statutory protection from retaliation, acquire public
vindication, achieve personal satisfaction in highlighting and helping
deter wrongdoing that harms innocent victims, demonstrate leadership and possibly advance professionally, protect employers’ profitability or existence, protect themselves from being held complicit in
the wrongdoing, and develop a support system of legal counsel and
whistleblower groups. Additional factors are retaliation, animosity,
ostracization among professional colleagues and personal friends,
loss of one’s job, financial hardship, and significant psychological and
physical maladies from stress. It is interesting to think about why
the potential cost for private parties who join the regulatory game is
so much greater than it is for regulators and targeted businesses. As
we saw, potential cost for private parties increases so much more in
Game Two than does the potential cost for the other players. After
all, P’s potential losses increase 480%, R’s potential losses increase
55%, and T’s potential losses increase 21% when P becomes a player.
One possibility is that the costs regulators and targeted businesses
experience are impersonal and are spread among many individuals
within an organization. By comparison, a private party’s costs are
borne by a single individual, and they are wrenching: personal and
303.
304.
305.
306.

See infra app. C chart C4, at 706.
See id.
See infra app. C chart C2, at 705.
See infra app. C chart C3, at 705.
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professional hardships, ostracization by friends, disdain by colleagues and potential employers, and enmity by the community.
As Game Theory has shown, the factors affecting regulators’ payoffs are the opportunities to acquire investigative and litigative assistance from P’s counsel, institutional knowledge about T and T’s industry, and inside information about the wrongdoing: what was going on, who was involved, and how best to investigate and prove it.
Additional factors include the waste of resources caused by private
parties who present incomplete or inaccurate information, the loss of
initiative to determine who to charge and for what conduct, and
damage to regulatory efforts by irresponsible private parties.
B. Altering the Nash Equilibria
Game Theory shows how entry of private players into the regulatory game alters the Nash Equilibria—the optimal strategies players
pursue given the likely strategies pursued by other players.
1. Impact on Regulators
R’s optimal strategy in a regulatory world where P is not a player
is to make its decisions within R, among R personnel, and under a
cloak of secrecy.307 This tradition of confidentiality exists, in part,
from habit and self-interest, but also for valid policy reasons such as
protecting the reputation of innocent individuals or businesses under
investigation, protecting witnesses who may be harmed or evidence
that may disappear,308 safeguarding national security,309 and allowing
enough time and opportunity for R to determine whether liability is
appropriate.310 When private parties participate in regulatory efforts,
R must modify this tradition of confidentiality if R wishes to benefit
from P’s information.311 Examples from Game Theory demonstrate
this. In Game Two, when R brings an action against T while working
with P, R’s net benefit is 190. In Game One, when R brings an action

307. See, e.g., JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 10 (1987):
Much of what prosecutors do is shrouded in secrecy. . . . Because the deliberations and decisions of a prosecutor and his staff might, if made public, affect a
defendant’s right to a fair trial, they are invariably kept secret. Practically anything a prosecutor does, if discovered, can become the subject of attack by a
savvy defense lawyer.
308. See supra notes 80-88.
309. Michael Waldman, Time to Blow the Whistle?, NAT’L L. J., Mar. 25, 1991, at 13-14.
310. Interview with John T. Boese, Partner Fried Frank, in Washington, D.C., in
CORP. CRIME REP., Mar. 2, 1998, at 13.
311. For the FCA to work, regulators and relators must work with each other, and
trust each other. As federal agents who work on qui tam cases explain, “[t]here is . . . a direct correlation between the successful resolution of [an FCA qui tam] case and the relationship between the investigators and relators during th[e] investigation, and this relationship can be summed up by one word—trust.” Mason & Leonard, supra note 138, at 12.
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against T without P’s involvement, the net benefit is 100. Similarly,
R’s net benefit in Game Two when R, working with P, wins the action
against T, is 480, while R’s benefit when winning in Game One,
where P is not present, is only 250.
Game Theory suggests an additional optimal strategy for regulators once private parties join in regulatory efforts. Game Two showed
that regulators can incur a significant cost when private players join
the regulatory game. They can lose valuable resources by investigating misguided, ill-conceived, or incorrect information presented by
private parties. To avoid this cost, regulators need to distinguish between helpful and unhelpful information. They also need to discourage private parties, by sanctions or otherwise, who bring unhelpful
information to regulators.
In short, Game Theory shows how R’s optimal strategy changes
from cloaking R’s decision-making process in confidentiality to opening it to include P. Game Theory also shows that it is costly for R to
work with poorly informed or mistaken Ps, and suggests that developing more efficient techniques for dealing with such Ps is important
to the continued viability of including Ps in regulatory efforts.
2. Impact on Targeted Business
The entry of P as a player in the regulatory game affects T’s optimal strategies in two ways: the extent to which T cooperates with R
and the type of corporate compliance plan T implements. P’s presence adds incentive for T to cooperate with R and to cooperate early.
When P becomes a player in the regulatory game, providing R information and assistance, R is more likely to pursue T and is more
likely to win any action R brings against T. As long as there is a reasonable chance that T will not be caught or found liable, it makes
sense for T not to cooperate with R. But once the chances of getting
caught and found liable increase, the more T stands to gain by cooperating with R. Game Theory shows this. In Game One, where P is
not a player, T achieves a net benefit of 100 when it chooses to disclose its wrongdoing to R; in Game Two, where P is a player, T
achieves a net benefit of 150 by disclosing. In Game One, T achieves
a net benefit of 200 by cooperating with R once R opens an investigation; in Game Two, T achieves a net benefit of 330 by adopting this
cooperation strategy. In Game Three, T achieves a net benefit of 135
by cooperating with R after R files an action against T; in Game Two,
T achieves a net benefit of 170 with such cooperation.
Game Theory also demonstrates how, whether P is a player or
not, T benefits more by cooperating with R once R has opened an investigation than by waiting until R files an action against T. In
Game One, T obtains a benefit of 200 by cooperating with R when R
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opens an investigation of T. Game Two, where P is a player, shows
the same thing, just with higher stakes: T obtains a benefit of 330 by
cooperating with R when R opens an investigation of T but only a
benefit of 170 by waiting to cooperate when R files suit against T.
This is for two reasons: the further the matter proceeds, the more resources R has had to devote to it and the less valuable T’s help is,
and also, when T waits until R has discovered enough to file an action against T, T simply looks expedient, not remorseful, when T decides to cooperate. As Game Theory shows, the terms and practice of
the FCA encourage T to cooperate with R. The FCA requires that defendants pay successful relators’ attorneys fees and costs, and by resolving the matter early, T minimizes these payments. Also, under
FCA custom and practice, R often invites T to discuss T’s potential
liability very early—as soon as R has completed its investigation of
P’s information.312 During these discussions, T is given the opportunity to review and respond to R’s evidence and to present additional
information to R.313 This invitation for dialog is unusual but, for a variety of reasons, makes sense for R under FCA practice.
The second way that P’s entry into the regulatory game affects T’s
Nash Equilibrium is by encouraging T to implement effective corporate compliance plans. Because the FCA rewards Ps who come forward and work with R, Ts need to be concerned about whistleblowers
within their midst. Ts can minimize the risk that whistleblowers will
come forward, or that they will have anything to blow the whistle on,
by increasing the effectiveness of internal governance. Ts can increase this effectiveness in two ways. If T’s internal culture encourages employees to violate the law, engage in fraud, or look the other
way when they see illegality occurring,314 T should change its cul-

312. R officers seek a lifting, or partial lifting, of the seal on P’s case so as to allow a
discussion between R and T of R’s case against T and to give T an opportunity to explain.
This opportunity occurs early, before R decides whether to intervene. McDermott, supra
note 107, at 25.
313. Id. at 26. On June 3, 1998, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General issued
guidelines entitled, Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health Care Matters, to all Department of Justice attorneys who handle FCA cases. Known as the Holder
Guidelines, this directive instructs DOJ attorneys to contact a health care provider before
concluding the DOJ’s analysis of liability, “notify a provider of their potential exposure under the False Claims Act and to offer the provider an opportunity to discuss the matter.”
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, to All United States Attorneys et al. (June 3, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/readingrooms/
chcm.htm (last vistited Jan. 10, 2004).
314. See, e.g., Marc Meltzer & Julie Knipe Brown, Bitter Pill: He Blew the Lid Off Lab,
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 1997, at C3 (When Robert Merena, a computer analyst who
became a qui tam whistleblower, raised questions about billing irregularities, he was told
by his bosses: “[w]e don’t pay you to think, we pay you to do your job.”); Jim Smith, Penn
Whistle-Blower Collects $2M for Warning About Scam, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 31, 2000,
at C12 (recounting how mental health counselors were told by their employer that they
would lose their jobs if they did not increase the enrollment of patients).
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ture.315 In addition, Ts should ensure that they have an effective corporate compliance plan,316 which not only discourages wrongdoing
within T but also encourages rapid, internal reporting of wrongdoing
instead of resorting to qui tam suits.317
In short, Game Theory shows how the FCA enhances businesses’
already existing incentives to cooperate with R, adds significant encouragement and opportunity for Ts to cooperate earlier in the matter, and compels businesses to establish internal systems to discourage future wrongdoing and to encourage internal reporting by employees instead of resorting to qui tam suits.
3. Impact on Private Parties
Of the three players, P is affected the most by the FCA. First and
most obviously, the FCA encourages Ps to abandon what was P’s optimal strategy of not reporting T’s wrongdoing, in favor of reporting
such information to R. As noted, in Game One, P reaped the greatest
benefit (40) by not reporting T’s wrongdoing to anyone. In Game Two,
such a do-nothing strategy yields P a net cost of -70, while reporting
to R yields a net benefit of 200.318 The FCA also encourages Ps to
work actively with R. The FCA does so by tying the amount of money
P receives at the conclusion of the case to P’s helpfulness to R in un-

315. Robert Vogel, Deterrent Effects of Whistleblower’ Lawsuits Justify False Claims
Act, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 4, 1991, at 73:
As these successful [FCA qui tam] cases are publicized and people become increasingly aware of the qui tam statute, dishonest contractors will set up internal procedures to prevent renegade employees from committing fraud for which
the contractor could be held responsible. In the long run, this will result in savings to the taxpayer, and improvements in the defense industry that far outweigh the costs of dealing with the baseless lawsuits.
See also Phillips Interview, supra note 3, at 11 (“The prophylactic affect of this law will be
the biggest payoff. You are not going to find people willing to take such risks when they
expose themselves to this kind of action.”).
316. John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Scope of Civil False Claims Act Is Cause of
Strife, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 8, 1999, at S1 (“Recipients of federal funds are stepping up compliance programs to protect themselves from the potentially devastating impact of an FCA
suit . . . .”); Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 14, at 53 (“The threat posed by qui tam relators
also has had a major impact on corporate regulatory compliance. Many responsible government contractors, in an effort to avoid qui tam actions, have placed regulatory compliance on the top of the corporate agenda.”); Compliance Programs Key to Limiting Exposure
to Qui Tam Suits, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, 1 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., Apr. 9, 1997
(“Health care providers’ first line of defense against lawsuits brought by whistleblowers is
to have in place a compliance program to effectively detect fraud and abuse . . . .”).
317. Components of an effective plan typically include a hot-line that protects a whistleblower’s identity while also gathering enough facts to rule out quacks and falsehoods, an
ombudsman, constant efforts to educate employees about the regulations that govern T’s
business, and reminders to employees of their internal reporting obligation and viable avenues for such reporting. FABRIKANT, ET AL., supra note 47, § 9.03.
318. See supra notes 259-96 and accompanying text.
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covering and proving T’s wrongdoing. FCA practice reinforces this.319
Experience under the FCA shows how collaboration between R and P
can strengthen the case against T, especially if P is still employed at
T.320
Game Theory also reveals a sad fact for Ps. There are costs for Ps
once they are invited to participate in the regulatory game. For example, the greatest cost P incurred in Game One where P was not a

319. For example, R often is willing to review P’s complaint prior to filing. As one
AUSA experienced in qui tam cases explained, “[I]t is advisable [for relators] to contact the
U.S. Attorney’s Office prior to filing the qui tam Complaint. . . . [Its attorneys] can offer
valuable assistance in ensuring that the procedural mechanics operate smoothly.” McDermott, supra note 107, at 22.
320. P can explain and interpret T’s policies and procedures, deliver otherwise difficultto-obtain documents to R, even wear electronic monitoring equipment. For example, Robert
Merena, a financial analyst at SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories (SBCL), remained so employed for eighteen months after he filed his qui tam lawsuit and had begun
working closely with federal agents and attorneys. United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1998). He produced numerous
helpful documents for the agents, including an internal SBCL directory which listed key
personnel at each of SBCL’s twenty-seven laboratories, located nationwide. Id. at 447. He
also produced a copy of SBCL’s 1993 monthly Billing and Accounts Receivables Reports.
Id. In another instance, Walsh, manager of General Electric Company’s overseas aircraft
operations in Israel who discovered diversion of federal funds, smuggled relevant records
out of Israel to Switzerland. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio
1992).
Removing documents and delivering them to investigators examining fraud charges can
be risky. If the employee taking them does not have access to such records and authority to
move them as part of his employment duties, such a practice could subject the employee to
disciplinary action or even criminal charges of theft. In addition, if law enforcement officials directed such removal in contexts that constitute an illegal search and seizure, the
evidence likely will be suppressed and the agents could face disciplinary action, if not legal
liability under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
In United States ex. rel Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F. 3d 1032, 103738 (6th Cir. 1994), Walsh, a General Electric employee assigned to serve as GE’s liaison to
the Israeli military on contracts for F110 fighter engines, discovered fraud upon the U.S.
government by a high ranking Israeli military officer and a GE executive. Before reporting
the fraud, Walsh collected documents and secretly monitored conversations. Id. at 1037.
After Walsh filed a qui tam action, he wore recording equipment at the DOJ’s request, collecting further evidence. Id. at 1038.
Federal Agents explain how early contact by a relator helped in their investigation of a
defense corporation (XYZ) for FCA violations:
Another extremely important factor to the success of the investigation was the
detail to which the complaint alleged criminal activity and documented specific
acts on behalf of conspirators. The detail included references to meetings and
other events that could be verified through subsequent investigation. The relators also kept detailed notes and records in the normal course of business which
provided much of the substantiating documentation for the historical facts.
Once [we] became involved, the relator still employed at XYZ was able to provide specific, day-to-day information as the case progressed, and to record conversations. These conversations and information were later used to persuade
other individuals to cooperate, to provide probable cause for affidavits for
search warrants, and used in court documents filed in support of the settlement.
Mason & Leonard, supra note 138, at 13.
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player, was -225.321 When P works with R, however, the greatest cost
P could possibly incur is -500.322 Thus, although P’s potential benefits
increase significantly when P is invited to join regulatory efforts, so
do P’s costs, mostly in the form of greater potential for retaliation.
Game Theory also demonstrates how the FCA affects P’s optimal
strategy for dealing with T when P is an employee of T. In Game
One, where P is not a player and does not have the FCA’s protection
against T’s retaliation, P’s optimal strategy is to not report T’s
wrongdoing or to challenge T in any way. Because the FCA gives
power and protection to employees who are willing to blow the whistle, Ps become significant threats to Ts that are engaged in wrongdoing. This means that Ts risk much more if they discount, marginalize, or penalize Ps who then alert R to possible wrongdoing within T.
Such leverage may strengthen P’s position on multiple employment
issues with T.323
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began with two goals. The first was to explore how a
private attorney general model such as the FCA alters the regulatory
world and whether the alteration is for better or worse. To examine
this issue, we asked three questions, beginning with why regulators
would be willing to compromise their independence, prosecutorial
discretion, and valued secrecy to work with private parties. Game
Theory shows the reason: doing so delivers more benefits than costs.
The benefits for regulators include obtaining information about
wrongdoing that regulators otherwise would not know about, developing a stronger case against wrongdoers, and conserving investigative and litigative resources.
The second question was why private individuals would want to
work with regulators when doing so almost certainly creates personal, professional, and financial hardships. Game Theory offers the
same answer: the benefits of cooperating outweigh the costs of not
doing so. In part, this calculus is because the costs increase for all Ps
in not reporting wrongdoing. Once Ps are empowered by a regulatory
mechanism like the FCA, there are many Ps who may blow the whistle; those who knew of the wrongdoing but stood by may find themselves being held liable. Mostly, however, this is because the benefits
offered to private parties who choose to participate with R are huge;
they include the potential of collecting a generous financial reward,
321. See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 252-302 and accompanying text.
323. The possibility that Ps may use FCA cases for leverage in other lawsuits or disagreements P may have with T is troublesome to the DOJ when the DOJ is making its intervention decision and determining how closely it will work with P. WEST, supra note 31,
at 49.
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the satisfaction of doing the right thing, and protecting oneself from
blame.
The last question we asked was how the private-public partnership produced by the FCA affects the decisions and strategies of targets. Game Theory shows that this partnering does two things: it encourages targets to cooperate with R, and it encourages T to implement effective corporate compliance plans.
Answering these three questions tells us that when the FCA or
any similar mechanism that pulls private parties into the public
regulatory effort, is good, it is very good. When it is bad, it is very
bad. The key lies with the private party. If the private party brings
information to regulators of real fraud, identifies real wrongdoers,
and brings valuable resources to regulators, the FCA—or any similar
mechanism—works enormously well. When the private party diverts
regulators’ resources and creates unnecessary costs for honest businesses by bringing information about mistakes, not fraud, made by
legitimate businesses, it is disruptive, oppressive, and irresponsible.
Understanding these dynamics makes FCA practice more efficient
and productive, and offers tantalizing opportunities for expansion of
an FCA-like model into other regulatory avenues.324
The second goal of this Article was to demonstrate the effectiveness of Game Theory for analyzing legal issues. I leave it to the
reader whether this goal has been achieved.

324. Bucy, supra note 20, at 79-150.
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Appendix A
Chart 1
Game 1(A); Node I
R Does Nothing

Benefits

Value

R saves investigative resources

30

T may be deterred

5

Total Benefits

35

Costs
T is encouraged, emboldened if learns of R’s decision not to
investigate

-10

T will have time to revise, improve upon its malfeasance
strategies

-25

More victims will be hurt

-25

Other Ts will be encouraged, emboldened if they learn of R’s
decision not to investigate

-10

Total Costs
Net Cost

-70
-35

Chart 2
Game 1(A); Node II
R Opens Investigation

Benefits

Value

R deters T
R deters other observant businesses

25
25

R’s opening of an investigation makes it difficult for T to continue
refining its wrongdoing methodology

25

R’s opening of an investigation makes it less likely T will expand
its wrongdoing to include more victims

25

R develops institutional knowledge of T’s behavior

25

Total Benefits

125

R’s investigation is inefficient, unfocused and unlikely to achieve
full success

-25

R incurs an opportunity cost: inability to investigate other
deserving Ts

-25

Costs

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-50
75
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Chart 3
Game 1(A); Node III
R Finds Nothing; Closes Investigation

Benefits

Value

R ends its investigative costs

25
25

R generates institutional knowledge

Total Benefits

50

Costs
R has incurred investigative expenses with no result

-25

R is unable to protect the public
R loses credibility

-25
-25

Morale within R suffers
R signals encouragement to T

-25
-25

R signals encouragement to other observant Ts

Total Costs
Net Cost

-25
-150
-100

Chart 4
Game 1(A); Node IV
R Initiates Action

Benefits

Value

Enhanced credibility for R among T and other observant
businesses
Enhanced credibility for R among potential witnesses
against T (T’s employees and competitors)

25
25

Enhanced morale within R

25

Minimize, if not prevent, more harm to victims

25

Deter T’s wrongdoing

25

Deter wrongdoing by other observant businesses

Total Benefits

25
150

Costs
Action may not be successful due to lack of inside info.
Significant investigative and litigation costs due to lack of
inside information

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-25
-25
-50
100
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Chart 5
Game 1(A); Node V
R Wins the Action

Benefits

Value

Public acknowledgment that T’s behavior was wrong
Education of relevant industry as to permissible and
impermissible behavior

50
50

Payment by T of judgment, fines, penalties

50

Enhanced credibility for R

50

Deterrence of T’s wrongdoing

50

Deterrence of wrongdoing by other observant businesses

Total Benefits

50
300

Costs
Opportunity costs: R was unable to pursue other Ts by
allocating resources to this T
Possible inability to recoup investigative and litigative
costs from T

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-25
-25
-50
250

Chart 6
Game 1(A); Node VI
R Loses the Action

Benefits

Value

An end to R’s costs

25

Possible deterrence of T

10

Possible deterrence of other observant businesses

Total Benefits

10
45

Costs
Lost credibility

-50

Lost out-of-pocket investigative and litigative costs

-50

R incurs opportunity costs: inability to investigate other Ts

-50

R’s loss signals to T and other observant businesses that
they can continue their wrongdoing with impunity

-75

Total Costs -225
Net Cost -180
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Chart 7
Game 1(B); Node I
T Does Not Disclose Wrongdoing

Benefits

Value

Avoids a finding of culpability

50
50

Avoids R sanctions
Avoid consequences that flow from R’s sanctions

Total Benefits

50
150

Costs
Uncertainty of when or if R will learn of T’s wrongdoing

-25

Likelihood that R will impose greater sanctions on T if it learns of
T’s wrongdoing and that T had adopted a policy of nondisclosure

-25

Opportunity cost: T loses the ability to influence R’s assessment
of T’s liability

-25

Opportunity cost: T loses the ability to influence the collateral
consequences of R discovering T’s wrongdoing and imposing
sanctions

-25

Opportunity cost: T loses the chance to minimize or manage
resources T expends in responding to R

-25

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-125
25

Chart 8
Game 1(B); Node II
T Discloses Wrongdoing

Benefits

Value

End the uncertainty of whether R will discover T’s wrongdoing

25

Influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability

50
50

Influence the sanctions R will seek
Influence the collateral consequences that flow from culpability
and sanctions

50

Minimize or manage resources T spends responding to R

25

Minimize or avoid liability T, or T’s executives, may incur for
failing to disclose T’s wrongdoing

25

Total Benefits

225

Costs
Opportunity cost: forgoes the possibility that R would never learn
of T’s wrongdoing
Sanctions R imposes

-25
-50

Consequences of a finding of liability and sanctions R imposes

-50

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-125
100
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Chart 9
Game 1(B); Node III
T Does Not Cooperate After R Opens an Investigation

Benefits

Value

Avoids R’s finding out about T’s wrongdoing

25

Avoids R’s sanctions

25

Avoids collateral consequences of R’s sanctions

Total Benefits

25
75

Costs
Prospect that R will uncover T’s wrongdoing
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect R’s assessment
of T’s liability
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect severity of
sanctions R seeks
Opportunity cost: loss of the ability to impact the
consequences that flow from R’s imposition of sanctions

-25
-50
-50
-50

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or at least
manage the resources T will expend in responding to R’s

-50

investigation

Total Costs -225
Net Cost -150
Chart 10
Game 1(B); Node IV
T Cooperates After R Opens an Investigation
Benefits
Value
T can make more informed decisions about strategy
T may be able to influence R’s assessment of T’s
culpability
T may be able to influence the sanctions R imposes on T
T may be able to influence the collateral consequences for
T of R’s sanctions
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the
resources T expends in responding to R’s investigation

Total Benefits

50
50
50
50
50
250

Costs
T will have to stop or cut back on wrongdoing

-25

T will spend resources in responding to R’s investigation

-25

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-50
200

682

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Chart 11
Game 1(B); Node V
T Does Not Cooperate After R Files Action
Benefits
Value
T forces R to prove its case against T; T may escape
liability if R cannot
T gets information about R’s case, commitment

Total Benefits

25
25
50

Costs
Uncertainty of not knowing how the action R has initiated
will be resolved
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect the finding of
culpability on the part of T
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect severity of R’s
sanctions if R prevails in the action
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the
consequences that flow from R’s imposition of sanctions

-25
-50
-50
-50

Opportunity cost: T will be less able to manage and
control its expenditures of resources in responding to R’s

-100

action

Total Costs

-300

Net Cost

-250

Chart 12
Game 1(B); Node VI
T Cooperates After R Files an Action

Benefits

Value

Enhanced ability to make an informed decision about
future strategies
Ability to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability in
resolving the action
Ability to influence R’s selection of sanctions against T
Ability to influence the consequences that befall T because
of the sanctions R imposes on T
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the
resources T expends in response to R’s initiation of an

75
25
35
35

15

action

Total Benefits

185

Costs
T will have to stop or curtail its wrongdoing
T will expend resources responding to and cooperating
with R’s investigation

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-25
-25
-50
135
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Chart 13
Game 1(B); Node VII
T Loses the Action Brought By R

Benefits

Value

An end to the tangible and intangible costs T was incurring
in litigating the action against R
An end to the uncertainty in which T was operating since
R first opened its investigation
Restructuring within T that possibly renders T a more
effective business overall

Total Benefits

10
10
10
30

Costs
Lingering effects of T’s response to R’s investigation and
action
Fines, damages, mandated internal restructuring

Total Costs
Net Cost

-100
-300
-400
-370

Chart 14
Game 1(B); Node VIII
T Wins the Action Brought By R

Benefits

Value

Avoids sanctions that accompany a finding of liability

200

Enhances T’s image as a “winner”

50

Obtains acquiescence to the behavior of T that was in
question (if propriety of such behavior was an issue)
An end to the uncertainty about and within T after R
opened its investigation

Total Benefits

20
20
290

Costs
Possible lingering effects of the expense (tangible and
intangible) in responding to the investigation and defending

-15

the action brought

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-15
275
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Chart 15
Game 1(C); Node I
P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T’s Wrongdoing

Benefits

Value

P will not precipitate retaliation by T

50

P will not incur T-imposed personal or professional
hardships associated with whistleblowing

Total Benefits

50
100

Costs
T’s wrongdoing may undermine P’s professional security

-20

P may end up being held culpable for T’s wrongdoing

-20

P may experience personal angst for not reporting T’s
wrongdoing

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-20
-60
40

Chart 16
Game 1(C); Node II
P Reports T’s Wrongdoing Internally

Benefits

Value

Possible prevention of future problems for T
Demonstrating leadership; as a result, P advances within
T
Minimizing or preventing P’s personal angst

Total Benefits

40
40
20
100

Costs
Possible retaliation by T and/or others within the relevant
industry
P’s time and energy

-40
-20

Personal and/or professional hardships as a result of
reporting the wrongdoing

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-40
-100
0
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Chart 17
Game 1(C); Node III
P Reports T’s Wrongdoing Externally

Benefits

Value

Possible prevention of future problems for T
Demonstrating leadership; as a result P advances within
T
Minimizing or preventing P’s personal angst for failure to
report

50
30
30

Demonstrate P’s non-culpability

50

Obtains some protection against T’s retaliation of P

50

Motivate T to remedy the situation

50

Total Benefits

260

Costs
Possible retaliation by T and/or others within relevant
industry; personal or professional hardships result for P

-160

P’s time and energy

-40

Personal discomfort at becoming a public figure

-25

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-225
35

Chart 18
Game 2(A); Node I
R Conducts Only a Minimal Investigation
Benefits
Value
T is deterred from its wrongful activity if T learns that R is aware
of T’s activity
Saves resources

100
5

Total Benefits

105

T is encouraged, emboldened if learns of R’s decision to only do
a minimal investigation

-10

Other Ts will be encouraged, emboldened if they learn of R’s
decision to only do a minimal investigation

-10

T will have time to revise, improve upon its malfeasance
strategies

-25

More victims will be hurt

-25

Signals to possible Ps within T that R is not responsive to them

-25

Signals to Ps in general that R is not responsive

-25

Encourages T and other aware businesses to retaliate against
Ps

-25

Costs

Total Costs
Net Cost

-145
-40
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Chart 19
Game 2(A); Node II
R Actively Investigates T

Benefits

Value

R deters T

35

R deters other observant businesses

35

R develops institutional knowledge

50

R signals support to future Ps

50

Total Benefits

170

Costs
Investigative costs

-35

Opportunity cost: inability to investigate other deserving
Ts

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-15
-50
120

Chart 20
Game 2(A); Node III
R Declines to Intervene in P’s Action

Benefits

Value

Save resources
Chance of sharing in any judgment P obtains

125
25

Total Benefits

150

Costs
Doom meritorious P case to dismissal or realization of less
success than case warrants

-35

Less able to guide P's exercise of prosecutorial discretion

-40

Empower T and observant businesses

-75

Lose opportunity to shape norms (i.e., to encourage view of
whistle blowers as courageous persons, not traitors)

-75

Total Costs
Net Cost

-225
-75
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Chart 21
Game 2(A); Node IV
R Intervenes in P’s Action

Benefits

Value

Enhanced credibility for R among T and other observant
businesses
Enhanced credibility for R among potential witnesses
against T (T’s employees and competitors)

30
30

Enhanced morale within R

30

Minimize if not prevent more harm to victims

30

Deter T’s wrongdoing

30

Deter wrongdoing by other observant businesses

30

Signals encouragement to future Ps

30

Total Benefits

210

Costs
Investigative costs

-10

Opportunity cost: R cannot pursue other deserving Ts

-10

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-20
190

Chart 22
Game 2(A); Node V
R and P Win the Action

Benefits

Value

Public acknowledgment that T’s behavior was wrong
Education of relevant industry as to permissible and
impermissible behavior

75
75

Enhances R’s credibility

75

Payment by T as judgment, fines, penalties

75

Deterrence of T's wrongdoing

75

Deterrence of other observant businesses

75

Signal encouragement to future Ps

75

Total Benefits

525

Costs
Opportunity cost: lost opportunity to pursue other Ts

-15

Investigative and litigative costs

-15

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-30
495
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Chart 23
Game 2(A); Node VI
R and P Lose the Action
Benefits

Value

An end to R’s investigative and litigative costs

25

Possible deterrence of T and other observant businesses

20

Total Benefits

45

Costs
Lost credibility

-75

Lost tangible and intangible expenses in pursuing the
action
Opportunity cost: unable to pursue other deserving Ts
R and P’s loss signals to T and other observant
businesses that they can continue their wrongdoing
R signals discouragement to future Ps

-50
-50
-75
-75

Total Costs
Net Cost

-325
-280

Chart 24
Game 2(B); Node I
T Does Not Disclose

Benefits

Value

Avoids a finding of culpability

35

Avoids R sanctions

35

Avoid consequences that flow from R’s sanctions

Total Benefits

35
105

Costs
Uncertainty in whether R will learn of T’s wrongdoing
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact R’s assessment
of T’s culpability
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the severity of
sanctions R seeks against T

-35
-35
-35

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the collateral
consequences of a finding of culpability and imposition of

-35

sanctions
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or manage
the resources T will expend in responding to R’s

-35

investigation

Total Costs
Net Cost

-175
-70
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Chart 25
Game 2(B); Node II
T Discloses

Benefits

Value

End the uncertainty of whether R will discover T’s
wrongdoing
Affect R’s assessment of T’s culpability

50
100

Affect R’s assessment of what sanctions to seek if T is
found culpable
Affect the collateral consequences that flow from a finding
of culpability for T and imposition of sanctions on T
Minimize or manage the resources T expends in
responding to any investigation R might initiate

Total Benefits

100

100

50
400

Costs
Opportunity cost: foregoes the possibility that R would
never learn of T’s wrongdoing
Sanctions

-50
-100

Collateral consequences that flow from a finding of
culpability and sanctions

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-100
-250
150

Chart 26
Game 2(B); Node III
T Does Not Cooperate When R Begins an Investigation

Benefits

Value

Avoids a finding of culpability
Avoids R’s sanctions
Avoids collateral consequences of sanctions

Total Benefits

10
10
10
30

Costs
Uncertainty in not knowing if R may initiate an action
against T

-20

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to influence R’s
assessment of T’s liability

-75

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect the severity of
R’s sanctions

-75

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the collateral
consequences that flow from R’s sanctions

-75

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or mange
resources T expends in responding to R’s investigation

Total Costs
Net Cost

-75
-320
-290
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Chart 27
Game 2(B); Node IV
T Cooperates When R Begins an Investigation

Benefits

Value

T can make more informed decisions about strategy
Ability to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability

75
75

Ability to influence the sanctions R seeks to impose on T

75

Ability to influence the collateral consequences for T of
R’s sanctions

75

Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the
resources T expends in responding to R’s investigation

75

Total Benefits

375

T will spend resources in responding to R’s investigation

-25

T will have to stop or cut back on wrongdoing

-20

Costs

Total Costs

-45

Net Benefit

330

Chart 28
Game 2(B); Node V
T Does Not Cooperate When R Joins P’s Action
Benefits
Value
T forces R and P to prove their case against T without T’s help

15

Information about the case against T

35

Total Benefits

50

Uncertainty of not knowing how the action R has initiated will be
resolved

-10

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to influence R’s assessment of
T’s culpability

-25

Costs

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect severity of R’s sanctions
if R prevails in the action

-100

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the consequences that
flow from R’s imposition of sanctions

-100

Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or manage
expenditure of resources in responding to R’s action

-100

Encourage the adjudicating authority to impose harsher
sanctions on T if liability is found on grounds that T’s
noncooperation unnecessarily consumed judicatory resources

Total Costs
Net Cost

-30

-365
-315

[Vol. 31:603

2004]

GAME THEORY

691

Chart 29
Game 2(B); Node VI
T Cooperates When R Initiates Action

Benefits

Value

Enhanced ability to make an informed decision about
future strategies

75

Ability to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability

25

Ability to influence R’s selection of sanctions against T

40

Ability to influence the consequences that befall T
because of the sanctions R imposes on T

40

Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the
resources T expends in response to R’s initiation of an

40

action

Total Benefits

220

Costs
T will have to stop or curtail its wrongdoing
T will expend resources responding to and cooperating
with R’s investigation

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-25
-25
-50
170

Chart 30
Game 2(B); Node VII
T Does Not Cooperate When P Continues the Action

Benefits

Value

Opportunity to avoid liability

60

Opportunity to avoid sanctions

50

Opportunity to avoid collateral sanctions

50

Total Benefits

160

Costs
Uncertainty of whether P will prevail

-5

Opportunity cost: to influence settlement

-20

Opportunity cost: to influence collateral consequences of
the settlement
Opportunity cost: to minimize and manage resources T
devotes to responding to P’s suit
Encourages the adjudicating authority to impose harsher
sanctions on T if T is found liable

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-20
-20
-5
-70
90
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Chart 31
Game 2(B); Node VIII
T Cooperates When P Continues the Action
Benefits
Value
Learn more about P’s case; enhanced ability to make
informed decisions about future strategy
Ability to favorably influence settlement

25
15

Ability to favorably influence collateral consequences of
settlement
Ability to minimize, manage T’s resources consumed by
responding to P’s suit

Total Benefits

15
15
70

Costs
Helping P when P couldn’t win otherwise

-200

T has stop or curtail wrongdoing

-25

Resources (tangible and intangible) expended to
cooperate

Total Costs
Net Cost

-25
-250
-180

Chart 32
Game 2(B); Node IX
T Loses the Action

Benefits

Value

An end to the tangible and intangible expenses T was
incurring in litigating the action brought against it
An end to the uncertainty created for T because of the
ongoing litigation
Restructuring within T that could make T a more effective
business entity

Total Benefits

10
10
30
50

Costs
Lingering effects of the investigation and action

-100

Fines, damages, mandated internal restructuring

-300

Empowering whistle blowers to come forward
Greater intolerance of financial aggression and resulting
consequences

Total Costs
Net Cost

-50
-50
-500
-450
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Chart 33
Game 2(B); Node X
T Wins the Action

Benefits

Value

Avoids the consequences that accompany a finding of
liability
Enhances T’s image as a “winner”

200
40

Obtains acquiescence to the behavior of T that was in
question (if propriety of such behavior was in question)
An end to the uncertainty created for T because of the
ongoing litigation
Generates publicity that may discourage future
whistleblowers

Total Benefits

40
40
50
370

Costs
Lingering effects of the expenditure of costs in defending
itself
Publicity may inform future whistle blowers

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-15
-10
-25
345

Chart 34
Game 2(C); Node I
P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T’s Wrongdoing

Benefits

Value

P will not precipitate retaliation by T

75

P will not incur T-imposed personal or professional
hardships associated with whistleblowing

75

Total Benefits

150

T’s wrongdoing may undermine P’s professional security

-50

P may be held culpable for T’s wrongdoing

-50

Costs

P may experience personal angst for not reporting T’s
wrongdoing
Opportunity cost: P will lose the opportunity to be a qui
tam relator and share in any judgment obtained

Total Costs
Net Cost

-20
-100
-220
-70
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Chart 35
Game 2(C); Node II
P Reports T’s Wrongdoing Internally

Benefits

Value

Possible prevention of future problems for T

40

P is viewed as demonstrating leadership; as a result, P
advances within T

40

Minimizing or preventing P’s personal angst

20

Secures protection under the FCA against retaliation by T

50

Total Benefits

150

Costs
Possible retaliation by T and/or others within relevant industry

-30

P’s time and energy

-20

P suffers personal and/or professional hardships as a result of
reporting internally

-30

Risks preemption by a P who reports externally

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-40
-120
30

Chart 36
Game 2(C); Node III
P Reports T’s Wrongdoing Externally

Benefits

Value

Possible prevention of future problems for T

60

P is viewed as demonstrating leadership; as a result P advances
within T

40

Minimizing or preventing P’s personal angst for failure to report

40

Demonstrates P’s non-culpability

60

Secures protection under the FCA against retaliation by T

60

Motivates T to remedy the situation

60

Through the FCA, P obtains a mechanism for reporting T’s
wrongdoing to a particularly effective outside source, the DOJ

75

Obtains benefit of counsel and support organizations counsel
will know about

25

May qualify as qui tam relator who will share in any judgment
obtained in a qui tam lawsuit

50

Total Benefits

470

Costs
Increased likelihood of personal or professional hardship
resulting from P’s whistleblowing, especially ostracization by
colleagues

-200

P’s time and energy

-40

P’s discomfort in becoming a public figure

-25

Cost of counsel (not compensated otherwise)

-15

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-280
190
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Chart 37
Game 2(C); Node IV
P Works Actively With R

Benefits

Value

Increases P’s percentage of any judgment obtained T by

50

actively working with R
P’s counsel will encourage P to work actively with R

50

P has a greater chance of influencing the outcome of the

50

case by actively working with R
P increases P’s personal and professional satisfaction by

50

actively working with R

Total Benefits

200

Costs
P’s time and energy

-25

Emotional stress

-25

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-50
150

Chart 38
Game 2(C); Node V
P Decided Not to Work Actively With R

Benefits

Value

Conserves P’s time and energy

25

Minimizes P’s emotional stress

25

Total Benefits

50

Costs
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to increase the
percentage of recovery P is possibly awarded

-50

Opportunity cost: P’s counsel loses the opportunity to
earn larger attorneys fees compensated under the statute
and a larger percentage of recovery; P may lose

-50

experienced counsel
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to influence R’s
conduct of the case
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to gain personal
and professional satisfaction by working actively with R

Total Costs
Net Cost

-50

-50
-200
-150
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Chart 39
Game 2(C); Node VI
P Continues in the Case as Co-Plaintiff With R
After R Intervenes

Benefits

Value

P (with R) will likely prevail in the suit

100

P will prevail without expending significant tangible
resources
P will be protected against retaliation by T under the FCA

Total Benefits

100
50
250

Costs
P’s time and energy

-25

Emotional stress

-25

Ostracization by friends, colleagues

-25

Future employment difficulties

-25

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-100
150

Chart 40
Game 2(C); Node VII
P Pursues Action Alone After R Declines to Intervene

Benefits

Value

P may win the action

15

If P wins the action, P would be statutorily entitled to a
larger percentage of the judgment (25-30%) if P pursues

15

the action alone than if R joins (15-25%)

Total Benefits

30

Costs
Poor chance P will win the action

-100

Tangible and intangible costs in pursuing action without R

-100

Loss of experienced counsel

-25

Greater risk of retaliation

-25

Total Costs
Net Cost

-250
-220
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Chart 41
Game 2(C); Node VIII
P Dismisses the Action After R Declines to Intervene

Benefits

Value

P avoids tangible and intangible costs

50

P minimizes the risk of retaliation

20

Total Benefits

70

Costs
Opportunity cost: P may win the action

-5

Opportunity cost: If P won the action, P would be entitled to a
larger percentage of the recovery because P pursued the case
alone

-5

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-10
60

Chart 42
Game 2(C); Node IX
P Wins the Action

Benefits

Value

Monetary recovery

300

Public vindication
An end to an emotionally draining experience

75
50

Total Benefits

425

Costs
Emotional strain

-50

Ostracization by colleagues, friends and within one’s
profession

-50

Total Costs
Net Benefit

-100
325

Chart 43
Game 2(C); Node X
P Loses the Action

Benefits

Value

End an emotionally draining experience

20

Total Benefits

20

Costs
Opportunity cost: lost opportunity for a large financial
recovery
Ostracization from friends, colleagues

-125
-125

Difficulty finding new employment

-125

Lingering effects (psychological and physical) from the
emotional strain of serving as a whistleblower

-125

Total Costs
Net Cost

-500
-480
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Appendix C, Chart C1

Change in Players' Payoff
When Private Parties Join
The Regulatory Game
Net Change in Potential Gain & Loss

500

Gain
Loss

400

300

200

100

0

P

R
Players

T
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Appendix C, Chart C2
Games From R’s Perspective
Game 1 (A)
No FCA

Game 2 (A)
With FCA

R does nothing

-35

-40

Node II

R opens investigation

75

120

Node III

R closes investigation

-100

Node IV

R initiates action

100

Node V

R wins

250

495

Node VI

R loses

-180

-280

Node

Event

Node I

(R Declines to
intervene)
-75
(R intervenes)
190

Chart C3

Games From T’s Perspective
Game 1 (B)
No FCA

Game 2 (B)
With FCA

T does not disclose

25

-70

Node II

T discloses

100

150

Node III

T does not cooperate in
investigation

-150

-290

Node IV

T cooperates in investigation

200

330

Node V

T does not cooperate after suit is
filed

-250

-315

Node VI

T cooperates after suit filed

135

170

-------

95

-------

-180

Node

Event

Node I

T does not cooperate with P after
R declines to intervene
T cooperates with P after R
Node VIII
declines to intervene
Node VII

Node IX

T loses

-370

-450

Node X

T wins

275

345

Note: For comparison purposes, Game 1(B) nodes VII and VIII are

listed as nodes IX and X respectively in Chart C3.
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Games From P’s Perspective
Game 1 (C)
No FCA

Game 2 (C)
With FCA

40

-70

P reports internally

0

30

P reports externally

35

190

-------

150

-------

-150

-------

150

Node

Event

Node I

P does nothing

Node II
Node III
Node IV
Node V
Node VI

P works actively with R during
investigation
P chooses not to work with R in
investigation
P continued in case as a coplaintiff

Node VII

P pursues action alone

-------

-220

Node VIII

P dismisses action

-------

60

Node IX

P wins action

-------

325

Node X

P loses action

-------

-480

Game 1 (A)
Regulatory Game Without FCA:
From R’s Perspective
Node V

Node VI

R wins the
action.

R loses the
action.

250

-180

Node III

Node IV

R finds nothing.
Closes
investigation.

R initiates
action.
100

-100

Node I

Node II

R does
nothing.

R opens
investigation.

-35

75
R learns of
T’s possible
wrongdoing.

Game 1(B)
Regulatory Game Without FCA:
From T’s Perspective
Node VII

Node VIII

T loses the
action brought
by R.
-370

T wins the
action brought
by R.
275

Node V

Node VI

T does not
cooperate.
-250

T
cooperates.
135

R closes
investigation.
Takes no action.

R files
action.

Node III

Node IV

T does not
cooperate.

T
cooperates.

-150

200

R begins
Investigation.

R does
nothing.

T’s strategies.
R’s action.

Node I

Node II

T does not
disclose.

T
discloses.

25

100
T commits
wrongdoing.

Game 1 (C)
Regulatory Game Without FCA:
From P’s Perspective

T does nothing
about the problem

T fixes the
problem

T retaliates
against P

T does not
retaliate against P

Node I

Node II

Node III

P does
nothing.

P reports
internally.

P reports
externally.

40

0

35

P’s strategies.

P learns of T’s
wrongdoing.
T’s action.

Game 2 (A)
Regulatory Game With FCA:
From R’s Perspective

Node V

Node VI

R & P win
the action.

R & P lose the
action.
-280

495

Node III

Node IV

R declines to
intervene.

R intervenes.
Works with P.

-75

190

Node I

Node II

R conducts a
minimal
Investigation.

R actively
investigates
T.
120

-40
R learns of T’s
possible wrongdoing
from private party (P).

Game 2 (B)
Regulatory Game With FCA:
From T’s Perspective
Node IX

Node X

T loses the
action brought
by R.

T wins the
action brought
by R.

-450

345

Node V

Node VI

Node VII

Node VIII

T does not
cooperate.

T
cooperates.

T does not
cooperate.

T
cooperates.

-315

170

90

-180

R initiates
action;
intervenes
in P’s suit.

R does not
intervene in P’s
suit.

P continues
alone.

Node III

Node IV

T does not
cooperate.

T
cooperates.

-290

330

R conducts a
minimal
investigation.

R conducts a
thorough
investigation.

T’s strategies.
R’s action.

Node I

Node II

T does not
disclose.

T
discloses.

-70

150
T commits
wrongdoing.
P files qui
tam action

P’s action.

Game 2(C)
Regulatory Game With FCA:
From P’s Perspective
Node IX

Node X

P wins the
action.

P loses the
action.

325

-480

Node VI

Node VII

Node VIII

P continues in the case
as co-plantiff with R.

P pursues
action alone.

P dismisses
action.

150

-220

60

Node V

Node IV
P works actively
with R during
investigation.

P does not work
actively with R during
investigation.

150

-150

Node I

Node II

Node III

P does
nothing.

P reports
internally.

-70

30

P reports
externally,
including filing
qui tam action.
190

P learns of T’s
wrongdoing.

P’s strategies.

